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Reimbursing Insurers’ Defense Costs: 

Restitution and Mixed Actions 

DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND* 
I. INTRODUCTION
The pejorative “Indian giver” describes a person who, having given a 
gift to another, takes it back or demands its return.  This childhood insult 
arguably has surfaced in the law of liability insurance.  A liability
insurer that provides its insured with a defense to a lawsuit, but that later 
seeks to recover from the insured the costs associated with the defense of 
uncovered claims, might be described by the insured or by an insensitive 
court as an Indian giver.  Having promised to defend its insured even
against suits that are “groundless, false or fraudulent,”1 an insurer that 
later seeks the reimbursement of its costs associated with the defense of 
uncovered counts or claims is sure to be viewed as reneging on the 
bargain it struck with its insured.2  The insurer is effectively taking back 
* Partner, Armstrong, Teasdale, Schlafy & Davis, Kansas City, Missouri.  B.S., 
Fort Hays State University; M.Ed., University of Nebraska; J.D., University of Kansas. 
The opinions expressed in this Article are the author’s alone; they are not necessarily
shared by his firm or its clients.  This Article uses the masculine pronoun “he” for
simplicity’s sake; it does not indicate any sort of gender bias. 
1. 1 SUSAN J. MILLER & PHILIP LEFEBVRE, MILLER’S STANDARD INSURANCE
POLICIES ANNOTATED 214 (1995) (homeowners policy form HO 00 03 04 91); see also
Redevelopment Auth. of City of Philadelphia v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 675 A.2d
1256, 1256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (“In a typical liability policy, the insurer agrees to 
defend the insured against any suits arising under the policy, even if a suit is groundless, 
false or fraudulent.”), appeal denied, 689 A.2d 235 (Pa. 1997). 
2. See Brent E. Johnson, A Policyholder’s Perspective: A Reply to Richard 
Giller’s Article “Insurer’s Right to Seek Reimbursement of Defense Costs: A National
Perspective,” 17 INS. LITIG. REP. 252, 254 (1995). 
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that which it promised to provide. 
Liability insurers’ legal entitlement to recover from insureds their 
costs attributable to the defense of uncovered claims, though hardly a 
new issue,3 merits special and renewed attention in light of the Supreme 
Court of California’s 1997 decision, Buss v. Superior Court.4  Relying  
on the law of restitution, the Buss court held that insurers may recover 
from insureds those defense costs attributable to claims that are not even
potentially covered under their policies.5  The effect of Buss will likely 
extend well beyond California; the decision has potentially far-reaching 
consequences for both insurance companies and insureds.6  This Article 
explores those consequences, ultimately concluding that insurers have a 
right to restitution depending upon the facts of the particular case. 
Part II of this Article discusses and explains liability insurers’ duty to 
defend their insureds against claims or suits by third-parties, including 
reservation of rights defenses and defenses provided pursuant to non-
waiver agreements. This Article goes far beyond California law but, 
because insurers’ right to reimbursement owes its development to the
courts of that state, Part III studies California courts’ path to Buss and 
the California Supreme Court’s decision in that case.  Part III also
discusses other jurisdictions’ treatment of many of the same issues.  Part
IV analyzes the legal foundations of liability insurers’ right to 
reimbursement of defense costs attributable to uncovered claims or suits
and examines criticisms of that right.  That analysis includes a 
discussion of restitution and its application in the liability insurance 
context.
3. Insurers began focusing on the possible recovery of defense costs following 
two California appellate decisions in the early 1980s.  See Safeco Title Ins. Co. v.
Moskopoulos, 172 Cal. Rptr. 248, 250-51 (Ct. App. 1981) (insurer’s reservation of rights 
letter reserved right to seek reimbursement of defense costs; right to reimbursement 
apparently assumed); Western Employers Ins. Co. v. Arciero & Sons, Inc., 194 Cal. 
Rptr. 688, 688-89 (Ct. App. 1983) (affirming insurer’s judgment against insured,
including restitution for defending uncovered suit). 
4. 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997). 
5. See id. at 768-69, 775-78. 
6. See Michael J. Brady, The Insurer’s Right to Reimbursement: The Forgotten 
Remedy Rediscovered, FOR THE DEF., Dec. 1997, at 29, 30 (stating that the Buss decision
“may have nationwide importance”); Alan S. Rutkin, Finding the Limits of the Defense 
Universe, BEST’S REV. (PROP./CAS. ED.), Nov. 1997, at 131, 131 (stating that the
principles and logic of the Buss decision “will apply in many jurisdictions besides 
California”); Andrew M. Reidy & Robert L. Carter, Jr., Calif. Insurer Wins Right to 
Regain Defense Cost, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 8, 1997, at C4, C4 (arguing that Buss “is likely to 
be far-reaching”); see also Dorn G. Bishop, Turning a Lemon Into Lemonade: Insurance
Carrier’s Stratagem in Buss Prompts Supreme Court to Revisit Defense Cost Allocation 
Issues, MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: INS. No. 11 (Nov. 12, 1996), at 21, 21 (discussing
intermediate appellate court’s decision).
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II. INSURERS’ DUTY TO DEFEND
A liability insurer is contractually bound to indemnify its insured in 
the event the insured is held liable to a third-party for bodily injury or 
property damage attributable to a covered “occurrence.”7  An insurer 
also has a contractual duty to defend its insured against lawsuits by
third-parties alleging liability within the coverage afforded by the 
policy.8  The liability coverage in a standard homeowners policy
provides that the insurer will “[p]rovide a defense at [the insurer’s]
expense by counsel of [the insurer’s] choice, even if the suit is 
groundless, false or fraudulent.”9  A standard commercial general 
liability (“CGL”) policy provides that the insurer “will have the right
and duty to defend any ‘suit’ seeking [specified] damages.”10 
An insurer’s duty to defend its insured against claims or suits is
separate and distinct from its duty to indemnify its insured for a covered 
loss or judgment.11  An insurer has a right and duty12 to defend its
insured whenever the insured is sued for conduct that is even arguably or
potentially covered under its policy.13  The insured bears the initial
7. “Occurrence,” when used in the liability insurance context, is a term of art.
Standard commercial general liability (“CGL”) policies define an “‘occurrence’” as “an 
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general 
harmful conditions.” 1 MILLER & LEFEBVRE, supra note 1, at 419. 
8. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 729 (2d ed. 1996). 
9. 1 MILLER & LEFEBVRE, supra note 1, at 214. 
10. Id. at 409 (form policy CG 00 01 10 93). 
11. See Chi of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1115
(Alaska 1993); Mutual Ins. Co. v. American Cas. Co., 938 P.2d 71, 75 n.7 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1996); TerraMatrix, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 939 P.2d 483, 486 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1996); Allstate Ins. Co. v. RJT Enters., Inc., 692 So. 2d 142, 144 (Fla. 1997); 
Franklin v. Western Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 574 N.W.2d 405, 406 (Minn. 1998); Allied Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 502 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Neb. 1993); 
Hanneman v. Continental W. Ins. Co., 575 N.W.2d 445, 453 (N.D. 1998); General 
Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Allen, 692 A.2d 1089, 1095 (Pa. 1997); Drexel Chem. Co. v. 
Bituminous Ins. Co., 933 S.W.2d 471, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Trinity Universal Ins. 
Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 821-22 (Tex. 1997). 
12. For recent discussions of the distinctions between an insurer’s right to defend
its insured and its duty to do so, see Sherwood Brands, Inc. v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co., 698 A.2d 1078, 1083-84 (Md. 1997), and Moeller v. American Guarantee
& Liability Insurance Co., 707 So. 2d 1062, 1068-70 (Miss. 1996). 
13. See Madden v. Continental Cas. Co., 922 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Ark. Ct. App. 
1996); Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766, 773 (Cal. 1997); Constitution Assocs. v. 
New Hampshire Ins. Co., 930 P.2d 556, 563 (Colo. 1996); Shunn Constr., Inc. v. Royal 
Ins. Co. of Am., 897 P.2d 89, 90 (Idaho 1995); Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Protection
Mut. Ins. Co., 655 N.E.2d 842, 847 (Ill. 1995); Maine State Academy of Hair Design,
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burden of establishing that the plaintiff’s allegations are within
coverage.14  The burden then shifts to the insurer to establish that the
facts alleged fall within an applicable policy exclusion.15 
As with all contractual duties, an insurer’s duty to defend has its 
boundaries.16  The insurer’s duty to defend is linked to coverage under
its policy;17 an insurer’s promise to defend its insured against even 
groundless, false or fraudulent suits does not affect this basic principle.
An insurer’s contractual obligation to defend baseless, meritless or
specious claims does not mean that it is bound to defend claims that its
policy does not cover.
Because a liability insurer is obligated to defend actions only of the 
nature and kind its policy covers,18 it is necessary to have standards or 
measures by which an insurer’s duty may be determined in any given 
case.  Courts generally take two approaches when determining if an 
insurer has a duty to defend.  The majority approach may be described as
the “eight corners rule.”19  Under this approach, an insurer’s duty to 
Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 699 A.2d 1153, 1156-58 (Me. 1997); Doe v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 667 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Mass. 1996); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fick, 572
N.W.2d 265, 267 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Ross v. Briggs & Morgan, 540 N.W.2d 843, 
847 (Minn. 1995); Bonner v. Automobile Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 899 S.W.2d 925, 929 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Roman Mosaic & Tile Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 704 A.2d
665, 669 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); City of Burlington v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 655
A.2d 719, 721 (Vt. 1994). 
14. See JERRY, supra note 8, at 729. 
15. See id.
16. See id. at 733; see also Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Co., 948 
P.2d 909, 921 (Cal. 1997) (stating that insurer’s duty to defend “is not unlimited”). 
17. No matter how broadly construed an insurer’s duty to defend might be, an 
insurer has no duty to defend when there is no potential for coverage under any theory. 
See, e.g., La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 884 P.2d 1048, 
1057 (Cal. 1994) (quoting Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 176 (Cal. 1966)); 
Continental Cas. Co. v. Brady, 907 P.2d 807, 810 (Idaho 1995); United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n v. Caplin, 656 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); MGM, Inc. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 77, 79-80 (Kan. 1993); Thompson v. West Am. Ins. Co., 839 
S.W.2d 579, 581 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992); Insured Titles, Inc. v. McDonald, 911 P.2d 209,
212 (Mont. 1996); Frontier Ins. Co. v. State, 662 N.E.2d 251, 253 (N.Y. 1995); Farmers 
Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Tex. 1997). 
18. See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 900 P.2d 619, 628 (Cal. 1995); see also
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 669 A.2d 45, 47 (Del. 1995)
(observing that duty to defend “is controlled by the terms of the policy”). 
19. See, e.g., Cheverly Terrace Partnership v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 642 A.2d 285, 
287 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Grzeskiewicz, 639 A.2d 
1208, 1210 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal discontinued, 647 A.2d 895 (Pa. 1994); National 
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex. 
1997).
The eight corners rule has other names.  Some courts prefer the “complaint allegation 
rule.” See, e.g., John Deere Ins. Co. v. Truckin’ U.S.A., 122 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 
1997) (discussing Texas law); Pancakes of Haw., Inc. v. Pomare Properties Corp., 944 
P.2d 83, 88 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997).  Others refer to the “exclusive pleading” rule. See, 
e.g., Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 638 A.2d 1196, 1201 n.1 (Md. 
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defend is determined by comparing the complaint or petition with the 
policy.20  If the facts alleged in the complaint or petition would give rise 
to liability under the policy if proven, the insurer must defend the 
insured.21 
The eight corners rule is easy to apply.  The simplicity of the eight 
corners rule makes it appealing to insurers and courts alike.  The rule is 
economically advantageous for insurers, because it allows them to avoid 
the cost of investigating plaintiffs’ claims to determine their potential 
defense obligations. But the eight corners rule is beset with problems 
that outweigh all of its claimed advantages.  Most fundamentally, the 
1994).
20. See, e.g., American States Ins. Co. v. Martin, 662 So. 2d 245, 247 (Ala. 1995); 
Tri-State Ins. Co. v. Sing, 850 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993); Hecla Mining Co. v.
New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1089 (Colo. 1991); Flint v. Universal Mach. 
Co., 679 A.2d 929, 934 (Conn. 1996); Charles E. Brohawn & Bros., Inc. v. Employers
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 409 A.2d 1055, 1058 (Del. 1979); American Continental 
Ins. Co. v. Pooya, 666 A.2d 1193, 1197 (D.C. 1995); Sunshine Birds & Supplies, Inc. v. 
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 696 So. 2d 907, 909-910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); 
Hawaiian Holiday Macadamia Nut Co. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 872 P.2d 230, 233
(Haw. 1994); City of Idaho Falls v. Home Indem. Co., 888 P.2d 383, 387 (Idaho 1995); 
American States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ill. 1997); Ottumwa Hous. 
Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Iowa 1993); James Graham 
Brown Found., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 279 (Ky. 1991);
Steptore v. Masco Constr. Co., 643 So. 2d 1213, 1218 (La. 1994); Northern Sec. Ins. Co.
v. Dolley, 669 A.2d 1320, 1322-23 (Me. 1996); Town of Ayer v. Imperial Cas. & Indem.
Co., 634 N.E.2d 571, 572 (Mass. 1994); Delta Pride Catfish, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 697 
So. 2d 400, 403 (Miss. 1997); Graber v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 797 P.2d 214, 217 
(Mont. 1990); Green Mountain Ins. Co. v. Foreman, 641 A.2d 230, 232 (N.H. 1994);
Lopez v. New Mexico Pub. Sch. Ins. Auth., 870 P.2d 745, 747 (N.M. 1994); Royal Ins. 
Co. of Am. v. Cato Corp., 481 S.E.2d 383, 386 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); Nodak Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Heim, 559 N.W. 2d 846, 849 (N.D. 1997); Sanderson v. Ohio Edison Co., 635
N.E.2d 19, 23 (Ohio 1994); Ledford v. Gutoski, 877 P.2d 80, 82 (Or. 1994); General 
Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Allen, 692 A.2d 1089, 1095 (Pa. 1997); Peerless Ins. Co. v.
Viegas, 667 A.2d 785, 787 (R.I. 1995); First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Sea Island Sport Fishing 
Soc’y, Inc., 490 S.E.2d 257, 258 (S.C. 1997); City of Ft. Pierre v. United Fire & Cas. 
Co., 463 N.W.2d 845, 847 (S.D. 1990); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Torpoco, 879
S.W.2d 831, 834-35 (Tenn. 1994); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 
821 (Tex. 1997); Select Design, Ltd. v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 674 A.2d 798, 800 (Vt. 
1996); Brenner v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 397 S.E.2d 100, 102 (Va. 1990); State 
Bancorp, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 483 S.E.2d 228, 233 (W. Va.
1997) (quoting Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Leeber, 376 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1988)); Reisig
v. Union Ins. Co., 870 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Wyo. 1994). 
21. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 127 F.3d 563, 566 (7th Cir. 1997)
(interpreting Indiana law); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Alves, 677 A.2d 70, 72 (Me. 
1996); Farmers Ins. Co. v. Romas, 947 P.2d 754, 757-58 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); Doyle 
v. Engelke, 580 N.W.2d 245, 248 (Wis. 1998); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 931 P.2d 127, 133 (Utah 1997). 
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rule is only an inclusionary standard. In other words, every complaint or
petition alleging a covered cause of action gives rise to a duty to defend. 
The eight corners rule, however, is not a valid exclusionary standard, 
meaning that the plaintiff’s pleaded allegations should not be dispositive 
of the insurer’s defense obligation.  The eight corners rule wrongly shifts 
courts’ and insurers’ focus to the four corners of the complaint or 
petition, rather than training attention on the four corners of the policy
where it belongs.22  The rule potentially allows an insurer to deny its 
insured a defense even if the insurer is aware of facts which, if pleaded, 
would entitle the insured to a defense.  Insureds understandably argue 
that truth and knowledge do not count under the eight corners rule. 
Second, the liberal notice pleading allowed in federal courts and most 
jurisdictions seriously undermines the already questionable validity of
the eight corners rule.23  Notice pleading embodies a very basic style and
lends itself to vague allegations, such that the facts on which an insurer’s 
duty to defend may be premised often are unknown or unknowable from 
the face of the petition or complaint.  An insured should not be denied a
valuable defense because of a plaintiff’s cursory, vague or unartful 
pleading.24  As the  Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Sunshine Corp.25 
court observed: 
It is true that the duty of an insurance company to defend its insured is
determined by the allegations of the pleading in which the claim against the 
insured is asserted . . . . But this does not mean that a particular choice of
[language] by the draftsman of a complaint against the insured can deprive the 
insured of its contractual right to an insurer-provided defense in a situation
where the plaintiff could recover a judgment for damages against the insured
even if the [language of the complaint] should prove ill-chosen.26 
In short, a third-party claimant should not be allowed to determine the 
insured’s rights under its insurance policy.27 
Finally, the eight corners rule promotes collusion between insureds
and plaintiffs.  An insured who fears being undefended can approach the 
22. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.E.2d 796, 798-99 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1993) (observing that “the duty to defend could attach at some later stage even
though the complaint does not specifically establish the duty”). 
23. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 545 N.W.2d 332, 335-36
(Iowa Ct. App. 1996); Mumford v. Interplast, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 259, 262-63 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1997).
24. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cochran, 651 A.2d 859, 865-66 (Md. 1995). 
25. 74 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 1996). 
26. Id. at 688 (citation omitted); see also Gibson v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
673 A.2d 1350, 1352 (Me. 1996) (“An insured is not at the mercy of the notice pleading 
of the third party suing him to establish his own insurer’s duty to defend.”). 
27. See Colonial Oil Indus., Inc. v. Underwriters Subscribing to Policy Nos. 
TO31504670 and TO31504671, 491 S.E.2d 337, 339 (Ga. 1997); Employers Mut. Cas. 
Co. v. Cedar Rapids Television Co., 552 N.W.2d 639, 643-44 (Iowa 1996). 
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plaintiff with a copy of his insurance policy and help the plaintiff craft 
an amended complaint or petition that is sure to trigger coverage.28  Such
behavior has untold economic consequences for insurers and it may have 
ethical ramifications for the lawyers involved. 
A significant minority of courts have expanded on the eight corners 
rule, sometimes requiring insurers to look beyond the pleadings to
determine if they owe their insureds a defense.29  Under this approach,
extrinsic evidence may trigger an insurer’s duty to defend.  An insurer 
“cannot ignore safely actual facts known to it or which could be 
known . . . from reasonable investigation.”30  It is the actual facts known 
to or ascertainable by the insurer that control the duty to defend—not 
just the allegations in the petition or complaint.31  The complaint or 
petition is merely the starting point in analyzing the insurer’s duty to 
defend. The consideration of extrinsic evidence when analyzing the
duty to defend is the more sensible approach, for an insurer should not 
be allowed to avoid its contractual duty by ignoring actual facts, nor
should an insured be penalized for a plaintiff’s unfortunate
draftsmanship.
The value to insureds of the extrinsic evidence approach, and the 
reasonableness of this approach in light of the purpose of liability
insurance, is easily understood by way of example.  Suppose that a 
28. See Blackburn v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 667 So. 2d 661, 670 (Ala. 1995) (“If
a complaint that did not allege acts covered by an insurance policy is amended to add 
allegations . . . that are covered under the policy, the insurer’s duty to defend is then 
activated.”).
29. See, e.g., State Dept. of Transp. and Pub. Facilities v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 939 P.2d 788, 792 n.1 (Alaska 1997); Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 900 P.2d 619, 627
(Cal. 1995); Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Disabled Am. Veterans, 490 S.E.2d 374, 376 (Ga. 
1997); Indiana Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ellison, 679 N.E.2d 1378, 1382 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1997); Spivey v. Safeco Ins. Co., 865 P.2d 182, 188 (Kan. 1993); Litz v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 695 A.2d 566, 570 (Md. 1997); American Bumper & Mfg. Co. v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 550 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Mich. 1996); Garvis v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co.,
497 N.W.2d 254, 258 (Minn. 1993); Standard Artificial Limb, Inc. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 
895 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Mapes Indus., Inc. v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 560 N.W.2d 814, 817 (Neb. 1997); SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists 
Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1266, 1272 (N.J. 1992); Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 
575 N.E.2d 90, 93-94 (N.Y. 1991); Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. United States 
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 714 P.2d 1143, 1147 (Utah 1986); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roffe,
Inc., 872 P.2d 536, 538 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. 
Travelers Indem. Co., 726 P.2d 439, 444 (Wash. 1986)). 
30. Standard Artificial Limb, Inc. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 895 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1995)
31. See Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Disabled Am. Veterans, 490 S.E.2d 374, 376 
(Ga. 1997); Standard Artificial Limb, 895 S.W.2d at 210. 
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plaintiff claims that an insured attacked and injured him, and that he did 
so intentionally and willfully.  The plaintiff pleads an intentional tort in 
his petition. When the insured tenders the matter to his insurer, the 
insurer refuses to defend. The insurance company, having compared the 
plaintiff’s petition with its policy, contends that there is no “occurrence”
giving rise to coverage under the policy and, even if there were, the
intentional acts exclusion in its policy excuses its duty to defend.32  In  
fact, the plaintiff was the aggressor, the insured was merely defending 
himself, and the insured neither expected nor intended the plaintiff’s
injuries. The insured explains the actual facts to the insurance company 
either upon tender or upon the insurer’s denial of a defense.  The insured 
may even document the actual facts by way of a police report or witness
statements.
The eight corners rule allows the insurer to ignore the actual facts; the 
plaintiff’s petition serves as a coverage fortress.  The rule operates to 
deny the insured the defense for which he paid premiums, that he 
reasonably expects, and to which his policy entitles him.  The insured’s
policy is meaningless and valueless unless the insurer rightly considers 
the extrinsic evidence. Resort to extrinsic evidence is necessary to
enforce the parties’ contract. 
Although an insurer may be required to consider extrinsic evidence 
when evaluating its duty to defend, such consideration has reasonable
limits.  The extrinsic evidence must relate to or clarify the allegations in 
the plaintiff’s complaint or petition.33  If the insurer’s review of extrinsic
evidence reveals that the plaintiff has other claims against the insured for
which he did not sue, the insurer can have no duty to defend based on 
those because they are not a part of the subject “suit.”34  And, while the
insurer may have a duty to consider extrinsic evidence, the insured has 
an obligation to bring to the insurer’s attention the extrinsic evidence it
wants considered.35  As a general rule, an insurer need not conduct an 
32. An insurer has no duty to defend where the conduct complained of is clearly
excluded under the policy. See, e.g., Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Peters, 948 P.2d 80, 85-86
(Colo. Ct. App. 1997); Littrell v. Colony Ins. Co., 492 S.E.2d 299, 299-300 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1997); Jerge v. Buettner, 687 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1997); B.L.G. Enters., Inc. v. First 
Fin. Ins. Co., 491 S.E.2d 695, 697-98 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); Farmers Tex. County Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 82-83 (Tex. 1997). 
33. See generally Spruill Motors, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 512 P.2d
403, 407-408 (Kan. 1973) (indicating that extrinsic evidence triggering insurer’s duty to
defend must relate to or clarify the allegations in the plaintiff’s petition). 
34. As noted previously, a standard liability insurance policy provides that the 
insurer shall have the right and duty to defend any “suit” seeking specified damages. See 
supra note 10 and accompanying text.
35. See City of Salina, Kan. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 856 F. Supp. 1467, 1480 n.9
(D. Kan. 1994) (stating that insurer must consider facts “brought to its attention”) 
(emphasis added). 
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independent investigation before rejecting its insured’s demand for a 
defense.36  The insurer must, however, communicate with the insured 
before unilaterally declining to defend.37  A simple letter asking the
insured to clarify its position with respect to potential coverage will 
suffice.38  An insured that does not bring relevant extrinsic evidence to 
its insurer’s attention cannot later complain that the insurer did not 
consider the evidence before declining to defend.39 
Regardless of the approach employed to determine an insurer’s duty to 
defend, any questions about whether a defense is owed are always
resolved in the insured’s favor.40  This principle is of tremendous
economic importance to insureds, for defense costs may be ruinous.
Defense costs may, and often do, exceed any settlement or judgment
ultimately paid.41  Insureds’ desire to secure a defense against third-party 
claims is probably as great a motive for purchasing liability insurance as 
is the need for potential indemnity.42  Because of its valuable defense 
component, liability insurance is essentially “litigation insurance.”43 
36. See id.; but see Koski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 572 N.W.2d 636, 639 n.5 (Mich. 
1998) (recognizing that an insurer’s duty to defend includes the duty to investigate 
whether the insured should be covered). 
37. See Towne Realty, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 548 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Wis. 1996), 
reconsideration denied, 555 N.W.2d 818 (Wis. 1996). 
38. See id.
39. See id. n.2.
40. See Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792, 796 (Cal. 1993); 
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, 927 S.W.2d 531, 534 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Hart Constr.
Co. v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 384, 389 (N.D. 1994); Klamath Pac. 
Corp. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 950 P.2d 909, 914 (Or. Ct. App. 1997); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Russo, 641 A.2d 1304, 1306 (R.I. 1994); North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kneen, 484 N.W.2d 
908, 912 (S.D. 1992); Smith v. Katz, 578 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Wis. 1998). 
41. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. RJT Enters., Inc., 692 So. 2d 142, 145 (Fla. 1997); 
Sherwood Brands, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 698 A.2d 1078, 1083 (Md.
1997); see also Richard C. Giller, Insurer’s Right to Seek Reimbursement of Defense 
Costs: A National Perspective, 17 INS. LITIG. REP. 132, 132 (1995) (arguing that the cost
of providing a defense often exceeds the amount of settlement or judgement to be paid). 
42. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal. 
1993); see also Campbell v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385, 392 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(“[I]t is undeniable that insurance is purchased to provide the peace of mind and security
that comes from knowing that if the insured contingency arises, the insurer will defend 
against the claim.”); General Accident Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 540 N.E.2d 
266, 271 (Ohio 1989) (noting importance of duty to defend to insureds). 
43. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 639 A.2d 652, 657 (Md. 1994) (“[A] 
liability insurance policy not only carries with it the promise to indemnify up to policy 
limits, but also the promise to defend; in that regard it is ‘litigation insurance.’”); 
International Paper Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 320 N.E.2d 619, 621 (N.Y. 1974) 
(referring to liability insurance as “litigation insurance”).
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The duty to defend is a recurring source of questions and problems for 
insurers. Many problems are attributable to the timing of the duty’s rise.
Unlike an insurer’s duty to indemnify, which arises only when the 
insured incurs liability for a claim44 and thereby guarantees the insurer’s 
obligation to pay only for a covered risk, the duty to defend arises upon 
the insured’s tender.45  An insurer’s duty to defend is thus determined at
the outset of the litigation, when coverage issues may be unclear, or 
when coverage questions are unanswered.  A complaint or petition may
contain both covered and uncovered claims, compelling the insurer to
defend the entire action, even though the plaintiff’s recovery ultimately
may be founded on an uncovered claim for which the insurer owes no
duty to indemnify.46  The insurer’s duty to defend does not depend upon
the insured’s ultimate liability.  In this way an insurer’s duty to defend is 
44. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 883 n.9 (Cal. 
1995); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1221 (Ill. 
1992); Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Perry, 692 A.2d 1388, 1391 n.3 (Me. 1997); 
South Macomb Disposal Auth. v. American Ins. Co., 572 N.W.2d 686, 711 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1997) (quoting Gelman Sciences, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 455 N.W.2d
328, 330 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990)).
45. See Purvis v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 877 P.2d 827, 830 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1994); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal. 1993); 
Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Clarendon Ins. Co., 642 N.E.2d 790, 793 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1994), appeal denied, 649 N.E.2d 415 (Ill. 1995); SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 
533 N.W.2d 603, 614 (Minn. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. 
Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995); First Bank of Turley v. Fidelity & Deposit Ins.
Co., 928 P.2d 298, 304 (Okla. 1996); George Sollitt Corp. v. Howard Chapman
Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 836 P.2d 851, 852-53 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
“Tender” refers to the insured’s request to its insurance company that the insurer 
defend it against a particular claim or suit.  See First Bank of Turley, 928 P.2d at 304. 
Effective tender requires at a minimum that the insured give the insurer actual notice of
the claim or suit.  See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 668
N.E.2d 627, 633 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); White Mountain Constr. Co. v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 631 A.2d 907, 910 (N.H. 1993); Harwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 896 
S.W.2d 170, 174 (Tex. 1995); Towne Realty, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 548 N.W.2d 64, 67
(Wis. 1996).  Depending on the jurisdiction, effective tender may require more than mere
notice to the insurer.  Some courts require that an insured make an “‘unequivocal and 
explicit’” demand for a defense.  Purvis, 877 P.2d at 831; cf. SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut.
Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 316 (Minn. 1995) (requiring “formal tender” of defense, 
presumably in the form of a letter).
46. If a single pleaded theory is covered, the insurer must defend the entire action,
even if the policy specifically excludes coverage for other causes of action. See National 
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Glenview Park Dist., 632 N.E.2d 1039, 1042-43 (Ill. 1994); 
MGM, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 77, 79-80 (Kan. 1993) (quoting State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Finney, 770 P.2d 460, 466 (Kan. 1989)); Employees Ins.
Representatives, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 653 So. 2d 27, 29 (La. Ct. App. 
1995), writ denied, 658 So. 2d 1268 (La. 1995); Frontier Insulation Contractors, Inc. v. 
Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 690 N.E.2d 866, 869 (N.Y. 1997); Town of Duncan v. State 
Budget & Control Bd., 482 S.E.2d 768, 773-74 (S.C. 1997) (construing Employers Mut. 
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hendrix, 199 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1952)); Drexel Chem. Co. v. Bituminous 
Ins. Co., 933 S.W.2d 471, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). 
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broader than its duty to indemnify.47 
When coverage is an issue, an insurer called upon to defend its insured 
has three options. First, it can simply defend the suit.  Second, it can 
refuse to defend. Third, it can defend the insured under a reservation of
rights.48  As a common variation on the third option, an insurer may 
defend pursuant to a non-waiver agreement with the insured.49 
If the insurer selects the first option, it waives any coverage defenses 
that it may have,50 or it will be estopped from asserting them later.51  The
insurer also assumes the cost of the insured’s defense.  The cost may be
significant, for the insurer’s defense obligation continues throughout the 
course of the litigation against the insured.52  An insurer’s duty to defend 
may even include a duty to appeal on the insured’s behalf.53 
If the insurer selects the second option and declines to defend its 
47. It is well-established that an insurer’s duty to defend is broader than its duty to
indemnify. See, e.g., Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Co., 948 P.2d 909, 921
(Cal. 1997); Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1089 (Colo.
1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. RJT Enters., Inc., 692 So. 2d 142, 144 (Fla. 1997); Commerce 
& Indus. Ins. Co. v. Bank of Haw., 832 P.2d 733, 735 (Haw. 1992); Indiana Farmers 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ellison, 679 N.E.2d 1378, 1381-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Essex Ins. Co. 
v. Fieldhouse, Inc., 506 N.W.2d 772, 775 (Iowa 1993); Yount v. Maisano, 627 So. 2d
148, 153 (La. 1993); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Crocker, 688 A.2d 928, 929-30 n.1 (Me. 1997); 
Doe v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 667 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Mass. 1996); Auto Owners Ins.
Co. v. City of Clare, 521 N.W.2d 480, 487 (Mich. 1994); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Todd, 
547 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Minn. 1996); Chase Resorts, Inc. v. Safety Mut. Cas. Corp., 869
S.W.2d 145, 150 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); John Markel Ford, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
543 N.W.2d 173, 179 (Neb. 1996); Estate of Teel v. Darby, 500 S.E.2d 759, 763 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1998); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 133 (Utah 
1997); Select Design, Ltd. v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 674 A.2d 798, 800 (Vt. 1996); 
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Northbrook Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 475 S.E.2d 264, 
266 (Va. 1996); First Wyo. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Wyo. 
1993).
48. See State ex rel. Rimco, Inc. v. Dowd, 858 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1993).
49. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
50. See Ogden v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 933 P.2d 1200, 1204 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1996); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529, 533 (Ct. App. 
1996).
51. See Doe v. Allstate Ins. Co., 653 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1995); AIG Haw. Ins. 
Co. v. Smith, 891 P.2d 261, 264-67 (Haw. 1995); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 
681 N.E.2d 552, 560 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
52. See Lambert v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 737, 739 (Cal. 
1991); Continental Ins. Co. v. Burr, 706 A.2d 499, 502 (Del. 1998); Home Sav. Ass’n v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 854 P.2d 851, 855 (Nev. 1993); Board of Pub. Educ. of Sch. Dist. 
of Pittsburgh v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 709 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). 
53. See generally Dennis J. Wall, Insurer Good Faith in the Appellate Courts:
Defend or Settle, FOR THE DEF., June 1997, at 30. 
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insured, it must be certain that its choice is correct, for the consequences
of a miscalculation may be grave.  An insurance company’s wrongful
refusal to defend its insured is a breach of contract.54  The insurer waives 
the opportunity to contest the insured’s liability.55  Such a breach may 
estop the insurer from raising policy exclusions or other coverage 
defenses in any subsequent action by the insured to recover policy
proceeds,56 or the breach may operate to waive the insurer’s coverage 
defenses.57  The insurer’s breach of its duty to defend relieves the
insured of its obligation to cooperate with the insurer in the defense of 
the suit and allows the insured to proceed in whatever manner it deems
appropriate.58  The insurer’s breach may eliminate its right to demand 
that the insured comply with policy provisions.59  For example, the
insured may reasonably settle the plaintiff’s claim without prior notice to
or consent by the insurer.60  The insurer’s liability for a settlement within
policy limits arguably makes some sense, for fundamental contract law 
requires that the policyholder be restored to the same position he would
54. See Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Perry, 692 A.2d 1388, 1391 (Me. 1997);
Whitehead v. Lakeside Hosp. Ass’n, 844 S.W.2d 475, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); 
Sanderson v. Ohio Edison Co., 635 N.E.2d 19, 23 (Ohio 1994); First Bank of Turley v. 
Fidelity & Deposit Ins. Co., 928 P.2d 298, 305 (Okla. 1996); Newhouse v. Citizens Sec. 
Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Wis. 1993). 
55. See Morgan v. Guaranty Nat’l Cos., 489 S.E.2d 803, 805-06 (Ga. 1997). 
56. See Grindheim v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 908 F. Supp. 794, 798 (D. Mont. 
1995) (interpreting Montana law); Bedoya v. Illinois Founders Ins. Co., 688 N.E.2d 757, 
763 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Mobay Chem. Co., 625 N.E.2d
151, 155 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992)); Insurance Co. of  Ill. v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 683 
N.E.2d 947, 949 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997). 
57. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 470
S.E.2d 556, 559-60 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). 
58. See Eigner v. Worthington, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808, 813 (Ct. App. 1997); D.E.M. 
v. Allickson, 555 N.W.2d 596, 602 (N.D. 1996) (quoting Brownsdale Coop. Ass’n v.
Home Ins. Co., 473 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)). 
59. See Whitehead v. Lakeside Hosp. Ass’n, 844 S.W.2d 475, 481 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992).
60. See Black v. Goodwin, Loomis & Britton, Inc., 681 A.2d 293, 298 (Conn. 
1996); MCO Envtl., Inc. v. Agricultural Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 689 So. 2d 1114, 
1116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Allickson, 555 N.W.2d at 602; Sanderson v. Ohio 
Edison Co., 635 N.E.2d 19, 23 (Ohio 1994); Northwest Pump & Equip. Co. v. American
States Ins. Co., 917 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Or. Ct. App.), modified, 925 P.2d 1241 (1996); 
Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 949 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah
1997) (quoting Waugh v. American Cas. Co., 378 P.2d 170, 177 (Kan. 1963)).
The test of whether such a settlement is reasonable “is what a reasonably prudent 
person in the position of the defendant would have settled for on the merits of the 
plaintiff’s claim.” Gulf Ins. Co. v. Noble Broad., 936 S.W.2d 810, 816 (Mo. 1997).  The 
insurer bears the burden of proving that a settlement taken without its consent is 
unreasonable. See id.
Similarly, any such settlement cannot be the product of fraud or collusion between or 
involving the insured and the plaintiff.  As with reasonableness, the insurer bears the 
burden of establishing that a settlement was procured as a result of fraud or collusion. 
See Red Giant Oil Co. v. Lawlor, 528 N.W.2d 524, 534 (Iowa 1995). 
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have occupied had there been no breach by the insurer.61 
Of course, the insurer must reimburse the insured for the costs 
incurred by the insured in defending the suit.62  The insurer also becomes 
liable for all other consequential damages that flow naturally from its 
breach.63  If defense costs and settlement or judgment amounts can be 
allocated between covered and uncovered claims they may be so 
allocated;64 if not, as typically is the case, the insurer is wholly liable.65 
Only if it exercises its third option and defends the insured under a 
reservation of rights or pursuant to a non-waiver agreement can an
insurer safely raise coverage defenses.66  By effectively reserving its 
rights an insurer does not waive its coverage defenses and it cannot be 
estopped from later asserting them.  A reservation of rights letter is 
simply an insurer’s unilateral declaration that it is reserving its right to 
later deny coverage, despite its initial decision to defend.  A reservation 
of rights letter does not evidence or imply the insured’s consent to the
insurer’s conditional defense.67  Even if the insured does not agree with 
61. See Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and 
Litigation, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 83 (1994); see also Jefferson Ins. Co. v. National 
Union Fire Ins. Co., 677 N.E.2d 225, 232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); A.B.C. Builders, Inc. v. 
American Mut. Ins. Co., 661 A.2d 1187, 1191-92 (N.H. 1995); Northwest Pump, 917 
P.2d at 1028 (“Because the duty to defend is contractual and settlement is a component
of defending, it follows that settlement is part of the performance of an insurance
contract.”).
62. See MCO Envtl., Inc. v. Agricultural Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 689 So. 2d
1114, 1116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Litz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 695 A.2d 566,
573 (Md. 1997); Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gamache, 686 N.E.2d 989, 991 (Mass. 1997); 
Concord Hosp. v. New Hampshire Med. Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 694 
A.2d 996, 998 (N.H. 1997); First Bank of Turley v. Fidelity & Deposit Ins. Co. of Md., 
928 P.2d 298, 305 (Okla. 1996); Kirk v. Mt. Airy Ins. Co., 951 P.2d 1124, 1126 (Wash.
1998).
63. See MCO Envtl., 689 So. 2d at 1116; Polaroid Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
610 N.E.2d 912, 922 (Mass. 1993); Whitehead v. Lakeside Hosp. Ass’n, 844 S.W.2d 
475, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). 
64. See Grand Cove II Condominium Ass’n v. Ginsberg, 676 A.2d 1123, 1131 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). 
65. See Richmond, supra note 61, at 83. 
66. See Townsend Ford, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 656 So. 2d 360, 365 (Ala. 
1995) (mentioning reservation of rights); Wheeler v. Reese, 835 P.2d 572, 577 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1992) (discussing reservation of rights); Hiser v. Rajki, 700 So. 2d 1302, 1302 (La. 
Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Steptore v. Masco Contr. Co., 643 So. 2d 1213, 1216 (La. 
1994)) (discussing effect of non-waiver agreement); Sands v. CIGNA Prop. & Cas. Ins. 
Co., 674 A.2d 169 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (suggesting that insurers should
always defend under a reservation of rights when coverage is at issue).
67. Indeed, in some states an insured may reject a defense offered under
reservation. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ballmer, 899 S.W.2d 523, 527 
 469





























or consent to the insurer’s reservation of rights, however, the insurer’s 
unilateral reservation generally remains effective.68  Because the right to 
contest coverage is the insurer’s alone it may be reserved unilaterally.69 
A non-waiver agreement is a contract between the insured and the 
insurer, whereby the insured agrees that the insurer retains the right to
disclaim coverage and the insurer agrees to provide the insured with a
defense until it does so.70  A non-waiver agreement is bilateral, whereas 
a reservation of rights letter is unilateral.71  A non-waiver agreement is in
effect a reservation of rights letter to which the insured consents.72 
A reservation of rights defense potentially benefits both the insurer 
and the insured. The insurer benefits by offering the insured a defense 
under reservation because by doing so it avoids potentially large liability 
for breaching its duty to defend without committing to the unnecessary 
expense of indemnifying the insured for uncovered liability.73  The  
insured benefits by the insurer’s defense under reservation because it 
does not have to fund the defense.  Although there exists a risk that an
insurer defending under a reservation of rights might pursue a 
declaratory judgment action to determine its contractual obligations, 
might withdraw its defense when it becomes clear that there is no
coverage, or might later seek the reimbursement of funds it advances to
settle the case,74 insureds easily subordinate these concerns to the
emotional and financial relief that an immediate defense affords.  The 
same advantages and concerns attend a defense provided pursuant to a 
non-waiver agreement. 
Insureds being defended under a reservation of rights or pursuant to a 
(Mo. 1995).
68. See Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766, 784 n.27 (Cal. 1997). 
69. See id.
70. See Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle of Insurance Defense 
Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 490 n.72 (1996) [hereinafter Lost in the Eternal
Triangle]; see also Employers Ins. v. George, 673 N.E.2d 572, 579 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1996) (stating that an insurer’s duty under a non-waiver agreement is to “participate in 
the defense until it exercise[s] its reserved right to disclaim”).
71. See Lost in the Eternal Triangle, supra note 70, at 490 n.72. 
72. See JERRY, supra note 8, at 795. 
73. See Steve Becker, Comment, The Refusal of Reservation of Rights Dfenses 
[sic] and Statutory Settlement Agreements in Missouri, 64 UMKC L. REV. 787, 791 
(1996).
74. See, e.g., Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass’n v. Goldberg, 680 
N.E.2d 1121 (Mass. 1997).  The Goldberg court held: 
Where an insurer defends under a reservation of rights to later disclaim 
coverage, . . . it may later seek reimbursement for an amount paid to settle the 
underlying tort action only if the insured has agreed that the insurer may
commit the insured’s own funds to a reasonable settlement with the right later 
to seek reimbursement from the insured, or if the insurer secures specific 
authority to reach a particular settlement which the insured agrees to pay.
Id. at 1129. 
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non-waiver agreement have seldom worried about insurers’ potential 
recoupment of defense costs.75  Even if insurers have enjoyed the right to 
recover defense costs attributable to uncovered claims or suits, they
typically have not attempted to do so.76  Insurers have viewed 
conditional defenses as a cost of doing business; in “mixed actions,” i.e.,
cases in which some claims potentially are covered and some are not,
defending uncovered claims is to be expected.  In some cases, the 
defense costs that can be allocated to uncovered claims are not so great
as to justify litigating their recovery.  It may not be possible to apportion 
defense costs between covered and uncovered claims.77  Regardless, 
insureds generally have come to view a defense under reservation in the 
same light as an unconditional defense.78  That view has always been 
inaccurate and unrealistic. Insureds who are being defended under 
reservation in mixed actions must examine their exposure following
Buss v. Superior Court.79 
Insurers’ right to reimbursement should most concern commercial 
insureds. Defense costs in commercial cases often far exceed those
incurred in defenses provided under personal lines policies.  Logically, 
insurers should be willing to fund litigation to recoup defense costs only 
where those costs are substantial. Commercial insureds are much more 
likely to have the financial resources to reimburse insurers for defense
costs attributable to uncovered claims.  Insurers are likely willing to 
spend time or money attempting to recover defense costs only from 
those insureds who can reasonably bear them.  Thus, most homeowners 
and individuals insured under automobile and other liability policies are 
75. See Michael Sean Quinn, Reserving Rights Rightly: The Romance and the 
Temptations, COVERAGE, July/August 1997, at 23, 33.  In the remainder of this Article, a 
defense provided in accordance with a reservation of rights letter or a defense provided 
pursuant to a non-waiver agreement often will be referred to simply as a defense
provided “under reservation.” 
76. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lesher, 231 Cal. Rptr. 791, 809 (Ct. App. 1986)
(noting undisputed evidence that “it was not the practice of Travelers or other insurers to 
seek recovery of attorney’s fees in cases defended under a reservation of rights”),
disapproved by Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997). 
77. See, e.g., Gibson v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 673 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Me.
1996).
78. This statement is not uniformly true, of course.  Insureds sometimes fear that 
reservation of rights defenses create conflicts of interest for insurance defense counsel. 
See generally Lost in the Eternal Triangle, supra note 70, at 485-95. 
79. 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997). The court held that an insurer has a right of
reimbursement for defense costs in a “mixed” action for claims not potentially covered 
by the policy. Id. at 776. 
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less vulnerable to reimbursement actions. 
III. WAITING FOR THE BUSS
Liability insurers’ right to reimbursement of defense costs incurred in 
connection with uncovered claims can be traced to dicta in a 1975 
California decision, Johansen v. California State Automobile Ass’n
Inter-Insurance Bureau.80 Discussing an insurer’s settlement of a case 
in which coverage is disputed, the Johansen court observed that if an 
insurer has reserved its rights and reasonably settles the case, and 
“subsequently establishes the noncoverage of its policy, it would be free 
to seek reimbursement of the settlement payment from its insured.”81 
The Johansen dicta was transformed into law by a California Court of 
Appeal that same year in Val’s Painting & Drywall, Inc. v. Allstate
Insurance Co..82 
Although born in relation to the duty to indemnify, it is not surprising 
that the right to reimbursement moved to the duty to defend. Defense 
costs are a significant financial concern for liability insurers.83  Fourteen 
cents out of every dollar insurers spend on liability claims goes to pay 
defense costs.84  To the extent they can recoup defense costs attributable 
to uncovered claims or causes of action, insurers are dollars ahead. 
This Section first discusses insurers’ right to reimbursement of 
defense costs as it developed in California. The right to reimbursement
developed in a series of state and federal decisions, the most significant
of which this Article treats in chronological order.85  Following that
survey is a discussion of the Supreme Court of California’s decision in 
Buss v. Superior Court.86  Finally, this Section analyzes other 
jurisdictions’ treatment of insurers’ claimed right to the reimbursement
of defense costs attributable to uncovered claims. 
80. 538 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1975). 
81. Id. at 750. 
82. 126 Cal. Rptr. 267, 270, 273-74 (Ct. App. 1975). 
83. See generally Karen A. Reardon et al., If You Paid for Legal Services Recently, 
Chances Are You Paid Too Much: Hourly Billing and the “Reasonable” Attorney Fee 
Standard, CPCU J., Sept. 1995, at 145, 146 (discussing tort system’s increasing costs 
and resulting financial pressures on insurers). 
84. See  INSURANCE INFORMATION INST., THE FACT BOOK 1998: PROPERTY/
CASUALTY INSURANCE FACTS 54 (1997). 
85. This Article does not discuss all California decisions on the topic. 
86. 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997). 
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A. The Development of California Law 
1. Cases
Insurers’ right to reimbursement of their costs incurred defending 
uncovered claims first surfaced, albeit shrouded in implication, in Safeco
Title Insurance Co. v. Moskopoulos.87  In  Moskopoulos, real estate
broker Paris Moskopoulos tendered his defense in a suit stemming from 
a flawed sale of residential property to Safeco, the title insurer on the 
property.88  Safeco agreed to defend Moskopoulos with counsel of his
choice, subject to a reservation of rights.89  Safeco reserved its right to 
assert that it had no duty to defend Moskopoulos, and its right to recover
its attorneys’ fees expended in his defense.90  Safeco filed a declaratory 
judgment action against Moskopoulos several months after assuming his 
defense.91 
The trial court entered judgment for Safeco, holding that it had no
duty to defend, and Moskopoulos appealed.92  The appellate court
likewise concluded that Safeco had no duty to defend Moskopoulos in 
the third-party action, and affirmed the trial court.93 
Moskopoulos did not even discuss Safeco’s right to reimbursement of
its defense costs and the court never held that an insured may be 
required to reimburse an insurer for the defense of uncovered claims or
suits. Yet, some commentators suggest that Moskopoulos “specifically
addressed this issue.”94  The Moskopoulos court did no such thing.  Even
reading Moskopoulos most generously, the court only implicitly 
recognized insurers’ right to reimbursement. 
An insurer’s right to reimbursement next became an issue
approximately two years later in Western Employers Insurance Co. v. 
Arciero & Sons, Inc.95  In  Arciero, the insured, Arciero & Sons, was a 
general contractor on a condominium project.  When a retaining wall 
collapsed after the project was completed, the condominium owners 
87. 172 Cal. Rptr. 248 (Ct. App. 1981). 
88. See id. at 249-50. 
89. See id. at 250. 
90. See id. at 250-51. 
91. See id. at 251. 
92. See id. at 249. 
93. See id. at 251-53. 
94. See, e.g., Giller, supra note 41, at 133 & n.12. 
95. 194 Cal. Rptr. 688 (Ct. App. 1983). 
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sued Arciero & Sons for damage to the wall, the slope held by the wall,
and the condominium units.96 
Arciero & Sons tendered its defense to Western, its general liability
insurer. Western accepted the defense under a reservation of rights. 
Western settled the condominium owners’ claims and then sued Arciero
& Sons for declaratory relief and to recover the sums it paid to defend
and settle the condominium owners’ suit.97  The trial court granted 
summary judgment for Western, holding that the damage to the wall,
slope, and condominium units was not covered.  The court of appeal 
affirmed the trial court’s ruling.98 
The Arciero court neither discussed nor endorsed Western’s claimed
right to reimbursement.99 The court apparently assumed, as did the
parties, that the insurer’s right to reimbursement followed automatically
if a defense was never owed.  Arciero & Sons did not appear to dispute 
Western’s right to reimbursement.  Arciero does not hold as a matter of
law that an insurer is entitled to recover its costs incurred in the defense 
of an uncovered suit,100 as the Ninth Circuit would correctly observe a
few years later in St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. Ralee Engineering
Co.101  Nonetheless, Arciero, like its relative Moskopoulos, is wrongly
cited as support for insurers’ right to reimbursement.102 
In Ralee, insurers’ right to reimbursement of defense costs was 
squarely presented as an issue for the first time.  The Ralee insurer, St. 
Paul, reserved its right to deny coverage and to withdraw its defense of 
an employment action.103  St. Paul’s reservation of rights letter to the
insured provided: 
For the foregoing reasons, in undertaking your defense, or conducting any
investigation it is to be clearly understood we are not waiving any right we have
to deny coverage or refuse to defend you further at any future time, and we 
hereby specifically reserve our right to do so without prejudice to any other
rights you or we may have under the policy.104 
It was ultimately determined that the St. Paul policy did not afford 
coverage and that St. Paul did not owe a duty to defend, and the insurer 
therefore contended that it was entitled to be reimbursed for the costs it 
96. See id. at 688. 
97. See id.
98. See id. at 689. 
99. See id. at 689-91. 
100. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Ralee Eng’g Co., 804 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir.
1986) (interpreting Arciero and California law).
101. 804 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986). 
102. See, e.g., Giller, supra note 41, at 133 & n.12. 
103. See Ralee, 804 F.2d at 521-22. 
104. Id. at 522 (quoting St. Paul reservation of rights letter). 
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incurred in defending its insured.105  The Ralee court rejected all of St. 
Paul’s arguments. 
St. Paul first argued that Arciero106 supported its right to
reimbursement.  The Ninth Circuit succinctly rejected this argument for 
the reasons noted above.107  The court further relied on the parties’ 
apparent understanding of their respective rights to deny St. Paul’s 
claim.  There was nothing in the record suggesting that the insured 
understood that it would be obligated to reimburse St. Paul for its 
defense costs if St. Paul eventually declined to defend the third-party 
action.108  In fact, St. Paul’s statement in its reservation of rights letter 
that it might refuse to defend “further at any future time”109 suggested a
contrary understanding.110 
Although the Ninth Circuit in Ralee denied the insurer reimbursement,
the court planted two important seeds. First, the Ralee court appeared to
suggest to insurers that if they wanted to recover their costs associated
with the defense of uncovered claims, they should expressly state their 
intention to do so in reservation of rights letters.  Second, an insured
must understand the insurer’s intention and right to seek the 
reimbursement of defense costs attributable to uncovered claims or 
actions before reimbursement will be allowed.111 
Within months of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ralee, a California 
appellate court authored Travelers Insurance Co. v. Lesher.112  In  
Lesher, Travelers’ insured, Dean Lesher, was sued for alleged antitrust 
violations. Lesher tendered his defense to Travelers, which agreed to
defend him under a reservation of rights.113  Travelers’ reservation of 
rights letter made no mention of the insurer’s intention to seek the 
reimbursement of its attorneys’ fees should it later be determined that its 
policy did not afford coverage.114 
105. See id.
106. Western Employers Ins. Co. v. Arciero & Sons, Inc., 194 Cal. Rptr. 688 (Ct. 
App. 1983). Arciero is discussed at supra notes 95-100 and the accompanying text. 
107. See Ralee, 804 F.2d at 522; see also supra notes 99-101 and accompanying
text.
108. See Ralee, 804 F.2d at 522. 
109. Id. (emphasis added). 
110. See id. 
111. See id. at 522-23. 
112. 231 Cal. Rptr. 791 (Ct. App. 1986), disapproved by Buss v. Superior Court,
939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997). 
113. See id. at 794. 
114. See id. at 809. 
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Travelers filed a declaratory judgment action in an effort to determine 
that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Lesher and to obtain
reimbursement of its costs incurred defending the antitrust suit.115 The
trial court granted Travelers’ motion for summary judgment on its claim 
that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Lesher, but allowed Travelers’
alleged entitlement to recover its fees and costs to proceed to trial.
Lesher cross-claimed against Travelers on several theories.116  At trial, 
the court granted Lesher’s motion for non-suit on Travelers’ fee claim.
The jury returned a bad faith verdict against Travelers on Lesher’s cross-
claim.  Travelers then appealed from the order of non-suit and from the 
judgment on the jury verdict.117 
As to its claimed entitlement to recover defense costs, Travelers first 
argued on appeal that its “‘complete reservation of rights’” was
sufficient to require the submission of the issue to the jury.118  The  
appellate court disagreed. The insurer’s reservation of rights letter did 
not address the possible reimbursement of defense costs.  The evidence
was undisputed that it was the practice of Travelers and other insurers 
not to seek the recovery of attorneys’ fees in cases defended under a
reservation of rights.119  The Travelers claim representative who sent the
reservation of rights letter testified that he did not intend in the letter to
advise Lesher that the company might seek the reimbursement of its
attorneys’ fees.120  The  Lesher court thus concluded that Travelers’
reservation of rights was insufficient to entitle it to reimbursement. 
In a final “cursory argument,” Travelers suggested that it had a right to 
reimbursement sounding “in the equitable doctrine of quasi-contract or
restitution.”121 The Lesher court rejected this argument as well.  The 
court observed that under “settled principles of restitution . . . a person 
who, incidental to the performance of his own duty or to the protection 
of his own things, has conferred a benefit upon another, is not thereby
entitled to contribution.”122 An insurer that defends under a reservation 
of rights because coverage is uncertain does so largely to protect itself
from a claim that it breached its contract with the insured.123  Although a
defense under reservation also benefits the insured, the insurer does not
primarily undertake the defense for the insured’s benefit.124 
115. See id. at 794. 
116. See id.
117. See id.






124. See id. at 809-10. 
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Accordingly, the doctrine of restitution did not permit Travelers’ 
recovery of defense costs.125 
Insurers’ recovery of their defense costs associated with uncovered
claims based on the principle of restitution was next discussed in 
Insurance Co. of the West v. Haralambos Beverage Co.126 The
Haralambos court rejected the insurer’s argument that it was entitled to 
restitution, first observing that in restitution, “money voluntarily paid to 
another with knowledge of the facts cannot be recovered back.”127  The
court embraced the reasoning of the Lesher128 court that an insurer’s
motivation in defending under a reservation of rights is the protection of 
its own interests rather than those of the insured, such that restitution is 
unavailable.129 
The Haralambos court noted that an insurer may recover its defense 
costs if there is an understanding between the parties that the insured
will reimburse the insurer for those costs should coverage issues 
ultimately be adjudicated in the insurer’s favor.130  Unfortunately for the 
insurer, the court concluded that there was no evidence of such an
agreement; neither the reservation of rights letter nor an “oral reservation 
of rights” were sufficient to establish the insured’s knowledge of the 
insurer’s right to reimbursement.131 
In Omaha Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Cardon Oil Co.,132 Omaha
Indemnity sent a reservation of rights letter clearly, unequivocally and 
repeatedly stating its intention to seek the reimbursement of its defense
costs.133  It was undisputed that the insureds knew “of Omaha 
Indemnity’s intention to seek reimbursement.”134  The insureds argued, 
however, that they never indicated any understanding or agreement that 
they accepted the insurer’s reservation of rights insofar as it related to 
the recovery of defense expenditures.135  The insureds maintained that
their silence could not be construed as acquiescence.  In short, Omaha
125. See id. at 810. 
126. 241 Cal. Rptr. 427 (Ct. App. 1987), disapproved by Buss v. Superior Court,
939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997). 
127. Id. at 434. 
128. See supra notes 112-25 and accompanying text. 
129. See Haralambos, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 434-35. 
130. See id. at 434. 
131. See id. at 434-35. 
132. 687 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d, 902 F.2d 40 (9th Cir. 1990). 
133. See id. at 504. 
134. Id.
135. The insureds did not respond to the reservation of rights letter. See id.
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Indemnity’s unilateral reservation of rights was ineffective when it came
to the reimbursement of defense costs.136 
The Omaha Indemnity court rejected the insureds’ argument,
reasoning that the insureds’ silence should be deemed acquiescence in
light of the insurer’s reservation of rights letter explicitly advising the 
insureds that it was reserving its right to reimbursement and that it would 
seek reimbursement in a court action.137  Because the insureds did not 
expressly refuse to consent to the insurer’s reservation of rights, the
court held that Omaha Indemnity adequately reserved its right to 
reimbursement.  The court granted Omaha Indemnity’s summary
judgment motion and ordered the insureds to reimburse the insurance 
company for nearly $500,000 in litigation expenses.138 
After Omaha Indemnity, the logical next step was a case in which the
insured did object to the insurer’s reservation of rights.  That case turned 
out to be Walbrook Insurance Co. v. Goshgarian & Goshgarian.139  In  
Walbrook, like Omaha Indemnity, the insurer sent an explicit reservation 
of rights letter, specifically reserving its right to recover all sums
expended “for defense, settlement or the satisfaction of the judgment.”140 
Unlike the insureds in Omaha Indemnity, however, the Walbrook
insureds twice objected to the reservation of rights by twice writing to 
the insurer refusing to consent to or acknowledge the validity of those 
rights.141 
Their protests notwithstanding, the insureds accepted Walbrook’s
defense payments for their independent counsel totalling $500,000.142 
The acceptance of these defense expenditures betrayed them.  The
Walbrook court reasoned that the insureds’ acceptance of the insurer’s 
defense payments was “inconsistent with their objections, as they [were]
refusing to accept the agreement yet retaining the fruits of it.”143  The  
court held that the insureds’ acceptance of the insurer’s monies
constituted an implied agreement to the reservation of rights.144 
Finally,145 the court in American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Allied-
136. See id.
137. See id. at 505. 
138. See id.
139. 726 F. Supp. 777 (C.D. Cal. 1989). 
140. Id. at 782. 
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 784. 
144. See id.
145. There are California cases decided after the last cases discussed here in which 
an insurer’s right to recoup its defense costs was an issue. See, e.g., Richardson v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824 (Ct. App. 1995), review denied and op. 
ordered depublished, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824 (Cal. 1995); Gossard v. Ohio Cas. Group of
Ins. Cos., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 190 (Ct. App. 1994), review granted and op. superseded, 888 
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Sysco Food Services, Inc.146 considered the adequacy of an insurer’s
conditional reservation of rights. The American Motorists insurer,
AMICO, attempted to reserve its right to recover its defense costs by 
way of a letter stating that the insured’s consent to the recovery was
required. The insurer’s reservation of rights letter provided: “‘For the 
time being, the Company will agree to defend reserving the right to seek
reimbursement of defense costs in the event it were to be ultimately
determined that there is no duty to defend and subject to the insured’s
agreement to such a reservation.’”147 Further, AMICO asserted its
conditional right to seek reimbursement only in its third reservation of 
rights letter; the company had previously sent two reservation of rights
letters in which it did not raise its claimed right to reimbursement.148 
The insured contended that AMICO was not entitled to reimbursement
of its defense costs because its third reservation of rights letter did not
create the contractual understanding necessary to permit reimburse-
ment.149  The  American Motorists court agreed with the insured.  The
court found that the requisite contractual understanding was lacking first 
because AMICO did not reserve its right to reimbursement until its third 
letter, and second because the right to reimbursement was conditioned 
on the insured’s consent.150  There was no showing that the insured had 
consented to AMICO’s conditional reservation.151 
AMICO argued that it was entitled to reimbursement because it had 
adequately reserved its right to seek reimbursement and because the
insured had accepted the defense.  The court responded by pointing out
that while the insured may have accepted the defense, it did not agree to 
AMICO’s reimbursement.152  While the insured did allow AMICO to 
pay its defense costs, AMICO began paying defense costs before it sent
the subject reservation of rights letter.153  It could not be said, therefore,
P.2d 236 (Cal. 1995), review dismissed and cause remanded, 906 P.2d 1 (1995).  As 
noted previously, however, this Article does not discuss all California cases.  Neither
Richardson nor Gossard add anything to this discussion and both cases lack precedential 
value because of their subsequent history.
146. 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106 (Ct. App. 1993), disapproved by Buss v. Superior Court,
939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997). 
147. Id. at 114 (quoting AMICO’s reservation of rights letter).
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. 
151. See id.
152. See id. 
153. See id. 
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that the insured had acquiesced to AMICO’s defense under reservation. 
The American Motorists court thus reversed the trial court’s judgment 
reimbursing AMICO’s defense costs.154 
2. Conclusion
California courts recognized an insurer’s right to the reimbursement of 
its costs associated with the defense of an uncovered suit, or uncovered
claims in a mixed action, before the Supreme Court of California 
decided Buss. Three general statements can be made about insurer’s 
right to reimbursement before 1997.  First, insurers’ right to 
reimbursement of defense costs was not based on the principle of 
restitution.155  The right to reimbursement was instead contractual, which 
leads to a second general statement: the right to reimbursement hinged 
on the parties’ agreement or understanding that the insurer had such a 
right.156  Absent such agreement or understanding by the insured, the
insurer had no right to reimbursement.157  Third, in order to establish the
requisite agreement or understanding, insurers had to clearly assert their 
rights to reimbursement in timely and unconditional reservation of rights 
letters.158 
B. Boarding the Buss
In Buss v. Superior Court,159 the Supreme Court of California raised
and answered four questions: First, may an insurer seek reimbursement
of defense costs from its insured? As to claims that are not even 
potentially covered under its policy, yes; as to claims that are potentially 
covered, no.160  Second, for what specific costs may an insurer be
reimbursed?  Those that can be allocated to claims that are not even
potentially covered.161  Third, who bears the burden of proof when an
154. See id. at 114-15. 
155. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Alan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 65, 69 (Ct. App. 1990); Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Lesher, 231 Cal. Rptr. 791, 809-10 (Ct. App. 1986). 
156. See Omaha Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cardon Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 502, 504 (N.D. 
Cal. 1988), aff’d, 902 F.2d 40 (9th Cir. 1990); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Medical Lab.
Network, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 901, 904 (C.D. Cal. 1988); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. 
Allied-Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 114 (Ct. App. 1993); Insurance Co. 
of the W. v. Haralambos Beverage Co., 241 Cal. Rptr. 427, 434 (Ct. App. 1987). 
157. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 756 F. Supp. 440, 445-46 
(N.D. Cal. 1991); American Motorists, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114. 
158. See, e.g., Walbrook Ins. Co. v. Goshgarian & Goshgarian, 726 F. Supp. 777,
781-84 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Omaha Indemnity, 687 F. Supp. at 504-505; St. Paul Mercury, 
690 F. Supp. at 904. 
159. 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997). 
160. See id. at 768. 
161. See id. at 768-69. 
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insurer seeks reimbursement?  The insurer bears the burden of proof.162 
Fourth, what is the insurer’s burden?  The insurer must establish its right 
to reimbursement by a preponderance of the evidence.163 
Plaintiff H & H Sports, Inc. (H & H) sued professional sports magnate
Jerry Buss and some of his related entities alleging twenty-seven causes 
of action. Buss tendered the H & H action to his various insurers.  All of
the insurers except Transamerica refused to defend, denying coverage.164 
Transamerica accepted the defense of the H & H action because
among the plaintiff’s twenty-seven causes of action was a single count 
alleging defamation. The plaintiff’s defamation claim was potentially
within the personal injury coverage of Buss’s two general liability
policies with Transamerica.165  In agreeing to defend Buss, Transamerica 
reserved its right to deny coverage.  “‘With respect to defense costs
incurred or to be incurred in the future,’” the insurer specifically
reserved its rights to be reimbursed for those fees or to obtain an
allocation of fees and expenses should it be determined that there was no 
coverage.166  Transamerica then agreed to pay on Buss’s behalf the cost 
of independent counsel, inasmuch as the conflict of interest posed by its
reservation of rights prevented the employment of its regular defense
counsel.167 
Buss responded to Transamerica’s reservation of rights with his own 
reservation rights. The parties then entered into an agreement, supported
by consideration, that provided for Buss to reimburse Transamerica for 
the appropriate pro rata share of defense fees and costs should a court
order such allocation.168  Transamerica would ultimately spend over
$1,000,000 defending Buss, with the cost of defending the defamation
count falling somewhere between $21,720 and $55,767.50 according to
an expert hired by Transamerica.169 
Buss settled the H & H action for $8.5 million.  Transamerica refused
to contribute to the settlement.  Buss then sued the insurer for breach of 
contract, bad faith, and declaratory relief.170  Transamerica cross-
162. See id. at 769. 
163. See id.
164. See id.





170. See id. at 770-71. 
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claimed, asserting that it did not owe coverage, that it was not obligated 
to contribute to the settlement, and that it was entitled to be reimbursed
for its defense costs in an amount to be proved at trial.171 
Transamerica moved for summary judgment on Buss’s complaint and 
won. Buss in turn moved for summary judgment on Transamerica’s 
cross-claim for reimbursement.172  The trial court denied Buss’s motion 
and he filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the appropriate court of 
appeal. The court of appeal denied a peremptory writ173 and Buss
petitioned the supreme court for review.174 
The supreme court necessarily had to address liability insurers’ duty to 
defend and it had to do so in the context of a mixed action, in which
some of the claims are at least potentially covered and others are not.175 
The Buss court allowed that an insurer must defend a mixed action in its 
entirety, but it could not justify that position as a matter of contract law. 
We cannot justify the insurer’s duty to defend the entire “mixed” action
contractually, as an obligation arising out of the policy, and have never even
attempted to do so.  To purport to make such a justification would be to hold 
what we cannot—that the duty to defend exists, as it were, in the air, without 
regard to whether or not the claims are at least potentially covered . . . . [T]he
duty to defend goes to any action seeking damages for any covered claim.  If it 
went to an action simpliciter, it could perhaps be taken to reach the action in its
entirety. But it does not.  Rather, it goes to an action seeking damages for a 
covered claim.  It must therefore be read to embrace the action to the extent that
it seeks such damages.  So read, it accords with the general rule, . . . that the
insurer has a duty to defend as to the claims that are at least potentially covered,
but not as to those that are not . . . . Even if [a] policy’s language were unclear, 
[a] hypothetical insured could not have an objectively reasonable expectation 
otherwise.176 
The court justified an insurer’s duty to defend a mixed action in its 
entirety as a prophylactic measure imposed as a matter of law in support 
of the policy.  “To defend immediately,” as it must, “an insurer has to 
defend entirely.” It cannot parse the claims, dividing those that are at 
least potentially covered from those that are not.”177 As to claims that 
are at least partially covered, the insurer gives and the insured gets the
funded defense for which they bargained.178  As to those claims that are 
not even potentially covered, however, the insurer may give and the 
insured may get much more than they bargained for if the defense of the 
171. See id. at 771. 
172. See id.
173. Buss v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 447 (Ct. App.), review granted and
op. superseded, 917 P.2d 1165 (Cal. 1996), aff’d, 939 P.2d 766 (1997). 
174. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 772. 
175. See id. at 774-75. 
176. Id. at 775 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
177. Id.
178. See id. 
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uncovered claims necessitates additional costs.179 
Turning then to an insurer’s right to seek reimbursement for its 
defense costs in a mixed action, the Buss court held that an insurer may
not seek to recover defense costs attributable to claims that are at least
potentially covered.180  “With regard to defense costs for these claims, 
the insurer has been paid premiums by the insured.  It bargained to bear 
these costs. To attempt to shift them would upset the arrangement.”181 
That would not be the case if the policy at issue provided for 
reimbursement, nor would it be the case if the parties entered into a
separate agreement supported by separate consideration.  In the first 
instance the policy would qualify itself, and in the second the separate 
contract would supersede the policy pro tanto.182  Apart from these two 
exceptions, an insurer may not seek the reimbursement of defense costs
associated with potentially covered claims.
Where a third-party’s claims are at least potentially covered, an 
insurer cannot have a right of reimbursement implied in fact in the 
policy, inasmuch as it bargained for such defense costs.183  Nor does the
insurer have a right to reimbursement implied in law.  Under the law of
restitution, this sort of right “runs against the person who benefits from 
‘unjust enrichment’” and favors the person who would suffer a loss as a 
result.184  If an insured is “‘enriched’” by the insurer bearing the defense
costs for which it bargained, the insurer’s burden is consistent with its 
contractual obligation under its policy and the enrichment therefore
cannot be deemed unjust.185 
As to claims that are not even potentially covered, however, an insurer 
is entitled to seek reimbursement from the insured for its defense 
costs.186  An insurer has no duty to defend its insured against such
claims.  The insurer has not been paid premiums for these defense costs 
and it did not bargain to bear them.187 To attempt to shift such costs









 187. The Buss court cited no authority to support this proposition and it may not in 
fact be true. See Quinn, supra note 75, at 33. 
188. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 776. 
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has a contractual right of reimbursement that is implied in fact in the 
policy, it has a quasi-contractual right of reimbursement that is implied
as a matter of law.189  The court again looked to the law of restitution for
support:
[U]nder the law of restitution such a right runs against the person who benefits 
from “unjust enrichment” and in favor of the person who suffers loss thereby.
The “enrichment” of the insured by the insurer through the insurer’s bearing of 
unbargained-for defense costs is inconsistent with the insurer’s freedom under
the policy and therefore must be deemed “unjust.”  It is like the case of A and B. 
A has a contractual duty to pay B $50. He has only a $100 bill.  He may be held
to have a prophylactic duty to tender the note.  But he surely has a right, implied
in law if not in fact, to get back $50.190 
Even if the policy’s language is unclear, the insured could not have an
objectively reasonable expectation that it is entitled to the windfall that it
would receive via the defense of clearly uncovered claims.191 
The court also reasoned that giving insurers a right of reimbursement 
made good practical sense.192  Without a right of reimbursement, an
insurer might be tempted to refuse to defend a mixed action—especially
one in which uncovered claims predominate.  With a right of 
reimbursement, the insurer faces no such temptation, for it rests secure
in the knowledge that it can recover any additional costs associated with 
the uncovered claims.193 
The second question for the court was, in a mixed action, what 
specific costs may an insurer recover from the insured?194  The answer, 
logically, is those defense costs that may be allocated solely to those 
claims that are not even potentially covered. 
The reason is this.  It is as to defense costs that can be allocated solely to the
claims that are not even potentially covered that the insurer has not been paid
premiums by the insured.  By contrast, the insurer has in fact been paid as to
costs that can be allocated solely to the claims that are at least potentially
covered.  So too as to costs that can be allocated jointly to the claims that are at
least potentially covered and to those that are not—by definition, these costs are 
fully attributable to the former as well as the latter.195 
The third question for the court dealt with the burden of proof.  Quite 
simply, when an insurer seeks the reimbursement of its costs defending 
uncovered claims in a mixed action, which party bears the burden of 
189. See id.
190. Id. at 776-77. 
191. See id. at 177. 
192. See id. at 778. 
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. Id. (footnote omitted).
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proof?196  The Buss court held that the insurer bears the burden of proof
because it is the party seeking relief.  The court saw no reason to depart 
from such basic evidence law.197 
The fourth and final question asked of the court was, in an action for 
reimbursement, what is the insurer’s burden of proof?198  Again tracking 
basic evidence law, the court held that an insurer must establish its right 
to reimbursement by a preponderance of the evidence.199  In so holding,
the court rejected Buss’s argument that the insurer’s burden should be
one of “undeniable evidence.”200 
Analyzing Buss in light of prior California law, it is obvious that the
supreme court’s most significant pronouncement was an insurer’s right 
to recovery grounded in the law of restitution and the threat of unjust 
enrichment to the insured.201  In doing so, the Buss court rejected the
reasoning first announced in Lesher202 that an insurer has no right to 
restitution because by defending a mixed action, it confers a benefit on 
the insured only incidental to the insurer’s own duty, and only out of its 
desire to protect its own interests.203  In other words, an insurer defends
under a reservation of rights not to benefit the insured, but to protect
itself from a subsequent breach of contract claim.204  The insured’s
benefit from a conditional defense is but a nice secondary effect. 
The Buss court rejected the Lesher reasoning hostile to restitution 
because it turns on motive, which is notoriously hard to discern.205 The
attribution of motive is especially difficult where, as in the case of an 
insurance company, any heart or mind from which motive might flow is
purely fictitious.206  The supreme court, therefore, avoided any 
consideration of “why the insurer acts as it does subjectively, [and] 
merely look[ed] to what results from its action objectively.”207  The  





200. See id. at 779-84. 
201. See id. at 775-78. 
202. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lesher, 231 Cal. Rptr. 791 (Ct. App. 1986), disapproved
by Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997). 
203. See id. at 809-10. 
204. See id.
205. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 777 n.14. 
206. See id.
207. Id. at 777-78 n.14. 
 485
RICHMONDPAGES 10/26/2018 11:08 AM    
 
























C. Other States’ Approaches 
Insurers’ right to recover costs incurred in the defense of uncovered 
claims or causes of action was an issue outside California before Buss, 
and it likely will be a bigger issue now.  The decisions from other states 
track California law before Buss. 
1. Cases
The Ninth Circuit analyzed liability insurers’ right to reimbursement 
under Nevada law in Forum Insurance Co. v. County of Nye.209  In  
County of Nye, the district court ruled in Forum’s favor at summary
judgment, holding that the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify
the County in the underlying action, and that the County was obligated 
to reimburse Forum for its defense expenses.210  The County appealed. 
Concerning Forum’s right to reimbursement, the insurer had 
“unilaterally, but explicitly” reserved its right to seek reimbursement in a
timely reservation of rights letter.211  Although the County objected to
Forum’s reservation, it accepted a defense valued “at hundreds of 
thousands of dollars” after the insurer reserved its rights.212  The County
insisted that its objection to Forum’s reservation of rights defeated the 
argument that by accepting the benefits of the defense the County had 
validated the reservation. The Ninth Circuit disagreed.213 
Under the rule the County proposed, an insured could deny the 
insurer’s ability to recoup significant costs merely by objecting to a
reservation of rights. The insurer would thus be required to withhold its 
defense in order to protect its own interests.214  “Such a result would 
benefit no one.”215  Following this course would prejudice the insured in
the third-party action, would potentially expose the insurer to other 
liability, and would foster additional litigation.  The better course is to 
allow an insurer to reserve its rights in the manner least damaging to 
both parties, so long as the insured clearly knows that it may later be 
208. See id. at 778 n.14. 
209. No. 91-16724, 1994 WL 241384 (9th Cir. June 3, 1994). This is an 
unpublished disposition.  The decision of the Court is referenced in a “Table of 
Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter. See Forum 
Ins. Co. v. County of Nye, 26 F.3d 130 (9th Cir. 1994). 
210. See County of Nye, 1994 WL 241384, at *1-2.
211. Id. at *2. 
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. See id. at *3. 
215. Id.
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held responsible for defense costs allocated to uncovered claims.216 
The court and the parties embraced California law in resolving the 
issues presented.217  The County of Nye court affirmed the district court’s
reimbursement of defense expenses incurred after Forum expressly
reserved its rights.  The County could not refuse Forum’s defense under
reservation yet retain the related benefits.  There was sufficient evidence
of an understanding between the parties that Forum would be reimbursed
for its defense costs.218 
California law guided a Minnesota federal court in Knapp v.
Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co.219  In Knapp, plaintiff Robert 
Knapp obtained a title insurance policy from Commonwealth for land 
that he purchased from a bankruptcy estate.  Knapp’s title to the land 
was subsequently contested. Commonwealth accepted Knapp’s tender
of defense, but did so under a reservation of rights.  The insurer 
specifically reserved its right to seek reimbursement of its attorneys’ fees
and costs if coverage were later denied.220  Commonwealth’s reservation 
of rights letter provided:
[T]his claim will be subject to a reservation of rights in favor of Commonwealth 
Land Title Insurance Company . . . . [I]t should be distinctly understood that no
action by Commonwealth heretofore or hereinafter taken in this matter is to be
constructed in any way as a waiver of our right to later disclaim liability in the
event it comes to light that Commonwealth has provided a defense for matters 
excluded from Policy coverage . . . . Commonwealth reserves the right to deny
the claim, discontinue payment of outside counsel and seek reimbursement from 
you for counsel fees and costs incurred by the Company by reason of the claim
subsequently found not to be within Policy coverage.221 
Knapp did not respond to the reservation of rights letter.222 
Commonwealth proceeded to defend Knapp and the case was lost. 
The district court granted Commonwealth’s motion for summary 
judgment against Knapp, holding that its policy did not cover the claim.
Commonwealth then sought reimbursement of the roughly $28,000 in
attorney’s fees and costs it incurred defending Knapp.223 
Knapp argued that because parts of the claims asserted against him 
487
 216. See id. 
 217. See id. at *2-3. 
 218. See id. at *3. 
 219. 932 F. Supp. 1169 (D. Minn. 1996). 
 220. See id. at 1170. 
 221. Id. (ellipses in original). 
 222. See id. at 1172. 
 223. See id. at 1170. 


































arguably fell within the scope of Commonwealth’s policy,
Commonwealth had a duty to defend him and was not entitled to 
reimbursement.224  The court succinctly rejected Knapp’s argument 
regarding the existence of a duty to defend.  But the determination that it
did not owe Knapp a defense did not necessarily entitle Commonwealth 
to the reimbursement of its defense costs.225  There being no Minnesota
law on point, the Knapp court looked to California law governing 
liability insurers’ right to reimbursement.226 
Knapp offered the court little to dissuade it from recognizing an 
insurer’s right to reimbursement of defense costs under certain
circumstances.  The court determined that California law was persuasive
and was consistent with Minnesota law surrounding the duty to
defend.227  Addressing the underpinnings of insurers’ right to
reimbursement, the court wrote: 
[C]ourts should be consistent in encouraging insurance companies to properly
meet their duty to defend [their] insured[s] against third party claims and 
minimize unnecessary claims to enforce policy coverage.  However, where an
insurer has properly met its duty and subsequently successfully challenges
policy coverage, it should be entitled to the full benefit of such a challenge and
be reimbursed for the benefits it bestowed, in good faith, to its insured.228 
The remaining question for the court was whether Commonwealth’s
reservation of rights letter adequately notified Knapp of his possible 
liability for defense costs, thus properly reserving Commonwealth’s
right to reimbursement.229  The  Knapp court concluded that
Commonwealth adequately reserved its right to reimbursement and 
clearly indicated that possibility to Knapp.230  Under those 
circumstances, Knapp’s silence in response to Commonwealth’s
reservation and his subsequent acceptance of the defense provided by 
Commonwealth constituted his implied agreement to the reservation of 
rights.231 
Colorado courts apparently embrace insurers’ right to reimbursement, 
although the issue has never been fully litigated.  In Hecla Mining Co. v. 
New Hampshire Insurance Co.,232 the Colorado Supreme Court stated
that in cases of questionable coverage:
224. See id. at 1171. 
225. See id.
226. See id. at 1171-72. 
227. See id. at 1172. 
228. Id.
229. See id.
230. See id. 
231. See id.
232. 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991). 
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The appropriate course of action for an insurer who believes that it is under no
obligation to defend, is to provide a defense to the insured under a reservation
of its rights to seek reimbursement should the facts at trial prove that the 
incident resulting in liability was not covered by the policy, or to file a
declaratory judgment action after the underlying case has been adjudicated.233 
The Hecla Mining court did not cite California authority to support its
position.234 
Another Colorado appellate court recognized insurers’ right to
reimbursement in Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. Peters.235  The Horace 
Mann court relied on the insured’s contingent liability to the insurer for 
the reimbursement of defense costs in determining that the settlement of 
the underlying tort action did not render a pending declaratory judgment 
action moot.236  In doing so, the court reiterated the requirement that an
insurer seeking reimbursement of defense costs must have reserved its
right to do so.237 
A Colorado federal court spoke on the issue in cursory fashion in First
Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co.238 
In First Federal, the court stated simply that an insurance company 
“may also reserve its right to deny its duty to defend and later recover 
for any attorney fees paid,”239 citing Walbrook Insurance Co. v. 
Goshgarian & Goshgarian240 and Omaha Indemnity Insurance Co. v.
Cardon Oil Co.241 for support.  The First Federal court did nothing with
that statement and it is difficult to tell whether it even applied that
principle of law to the facts at bar.242 
2. Conclusion
There is nothing in County of Nye, Knapp, Hecla Mining, Horace 
Mann or First Federal to suggest that those courts would have strayed 
from the California reimbursement path before Buss. The County of 
233. Id. at 1089. 
234. See id. at 1089-90. 
235. 948 P.2d 80 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997). 
236. See id. at 84-85. 
237. See id. at 84. 
238. 793 F. Supp. 265 (D. Colo. 1992), aff’d, 19 F.3d 528 (10th Cir. 1994). 
239. Id. at 269. 
240. 726 F. Supp. 777, 781-82 (C.D. Cal. 1989). 
241. 687 F. Supp. 502, 505 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d, 902 F.2d 40 (9th Cir. 1990). 
242. See First Federal, 793 F. Supp. at 270 (holding that insurer was entitled to 
recover its costs, but not distinguishing between costs typically awarded to prevailing
party at summary judgment and defense costs to be reimbursed). 
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Nye, Knapp and First Federal courts were guided by California law, and
the Hecla Mining and Horace Mann courts adopted principles 
enunciated in California cases without express reference.  It seems 
reasonable, then, to anticipate or expect that Buss will likewise influence 
law beyond California’s borders. 
IV. THE RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT EXAMINED
Insurers’ right to recoup their costs incurred defending uncovered
claims from their insureds is a controversial topic.  Policyholders and 
their counsel quite naturally believe that insurers’ right to reimbursement
of defense costs devalues liability insurance.243  Insurers, on the other
hand, contend that they did not bargain to defend uncovered claims and 
that insureds should not receive a benefit for which they did not pay 
premiums.244 
A. Policyholders’ Perspective
At a visceral level, policyholders fear that recognizing a right of
reimbursement nullifies the duty to defend. 
Only by subordinating the duty to defend to the indemnity obligation in [a 
liability insurance] policy can one ever justify permitting a carrier to seek
recoupment of defense costs it voluntarily incurred under a reservation of rights
made after determining that there is at least a possibility of coverage under the 
policy.  Taken to its logical extreme, the recoupment of defense costs would
collapse the defense obligation, i.e., if there is ultimately no indemnity 
obligation, the insurer should not have been required to pay (“front”) the 
defense costs in the first place and ought to be able to get its money back.245 
There is at least one basic problem with this appealing argument.  That 
is, the defense nullification argument appears to turn on insureds’ belief 
that insurers’ contractual obligation to defend even groundless, false or
fraudulent suits includes a promise to defend “questionably covered 
claims.”246  As noted previously, however, insurers’ duty to defend even
baseless or meritless suits does not mean that insurers are contractually 
bound to defend uncovered causes of action.247  Insurers’ duty to defend 
mixed actions in their entirety is a prophylactic obligation imposed by
law, not an obligation arising out of their policies.248 
243. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 2, at 254. 
244. See generally Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766, 775-76 (Cal. 1997). 
245. Johnson, supra note 2, at 254. 
246. Id.
247. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text; see also Richard C. Giller, A 
Further Explanation as to Why Insurers Are Entitled to Seek Reimbursement of Defense
Costs, 17 INS. LITIG. REP. 319, 320 (1995) [hereinafter A Further Explanation].
248. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 775. 
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Insurers are not entitled to recoup their defense costs attributable to
uncovered claims or causes of action incurred before a negative 
coverage determination is made.  The duty to defend can be extinguished
only prospectively, not retroactively.249  An insurer must defend until it
can be shown that no claim can in fact be covered under the policy.250 
Buss does not change this rule.251 
Second, insureds argue that insurers cannot reserve their rights to seek
reimbursement of defense costs.  A reservation of rights is necessarily
limited to the insurer’s indemnity obligation based on the time that the 
duty to defend arises.
Since the duty arises at the outset of the potentially covered action  and the
defense determination made upon a comparison of the complaint and the policy 
provisions, there is no reason for a reservation in the first place; the duty to
defend is ripe for decision.  It is essentially nonsensical for an insurer to state 
that, while it has all of the facts necessary to make a determination of the duty
to defend, it wishes to reserve its right to later renege on [that] initial
determination . . . .252 
Moreover, insurers have no policy right to seek the reimbursement of 
defense costs; accordingly, there is no right to reserve.253 
The term “reservation of rights” arguably is a misnomer when it 
comes to reimbursing defense costs.  Only an antecedent right can be
reserved; an insurer cannot use a reservation of rights letter to create new 
contractual rights. With respect to the reimbursement of defense costs,
then, a reservation of rights letter might be better described as a 
“reservation of claims” letter.254 
At the outset, this argument fails miserably when applied to mixed 
actions. An insurer defending a mixed action under reservation has most 
certainly determined that it has no duty to defend specified claims, but 
the law obligates it to defend the entire action anyway.  An insurer that
defends a mixed action under reservation and later seeks the 
reimbursement of its defense costs attributable to uncovered claims is
reneging on nothing.  This argument also ignores the point that an
insurer’s duty to defend can only be extinguished prospectively.  If an
249. See id. at 773. 
250. See id.
251. See id.
 252. Johnson, supra note 2, at 255 (footnote omitted). 
253. See id.
254. I am grateful to Professor Robert H. Jerry, II, a leading insurance law scholar, 
who suggested this description in casual conversation.
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insurer defends until it is determined that there is no duty to do so under 
any theory, it has fulfilled its contractual obligation.  The insured has 
received all the defense to which it was entitled.  Again, the insurer has 
reneged on nothing.
To the extent this argument assumes (or at least implies) that an 
insurer cannot recoup defense costs because it did not expressly provide 
for possible reimbursement in its policy, it again fails.  The fact that a 
policy does not grant the insurer a right to reimbursement does not 
render the contract incomplete.  The policy provides that the insurer will
defend only to the extent of its coverage.  If an insurer truly is entitled to 
the reimbursement of its defense costs attributable to a particular claim,
logic and law dictate that there was no duty to defend that claim in the
first place. The insured was not contractually entitled to the benefit of a 
defense. Recognizing a right to reimbursement thus ensures that an 
insured gets only the benefits for which its policy provides.255 
Furthermore, an insurer that asserts its right to reimbursement in a 
reservation of rights letter is not creating that right in its correspondence.
A reservation of rights letter, though perhaps misnamed in this context,
serves as a demand for reimbursement on the insured.256 In some states 
recognizing an insurer’s quasi-contractual right to reimbursement, such a 
demand may be a prerequisite to recovery.257 
It is also possible that the insurer’s right to reimbursement is “implied 
in fact in the policy as contractual.”258  If so, a reservation of rights letter 
is not misnamed in this context.  An insurer must reserve its right to 
reimbursement to avoid waiving its right,259 or to avoid the loss of its
right via estoppel.
Third, allowing insurers to recover their defense costs attributable to 
uncovered claims will spawn considerable new litigation as insurers 
attempt to enforce their rights.260  History does not support this
argument. Insurers’ right to reimbursement has existed for more than a 
decade, yet there are few reported cases on the subject.261  Insurers have
a right to reimbursement only where defense costs can be allocated
solely to claims that are not even potentially covered.262  In many cases 
it is not feasible to allocate defense costs between covered and 
255. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 776; A Further Explanation, supra note 247, at 320. 




260. See id. at 781 (discussing this argument in connection with burden of proof).
261. See supra notes 87-242, and accompanying text. 
262. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 781. 
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uncovered claims.263  Additionally, insurers pursue reimbursement only
in exceptional cases. Beyond the threshold requirement that defense 
costs subject to reimbursement are strictly limited to clearly uncovered
claims, insurers will as a matter of simple economics pursue 
reimbursement only where defense costs are substantial.264  The defense
costs subject to recovery must be great enough to justify to the insurer 
the cost of the related litigation.  Further, the insured must have the 
financial resources to reimburse the defense costs sought;265 it would be
pointless for an insurer to spend money litigating a right without
economic benefit. 
It might reasonably be argued that an insurer’s implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing prevents it from suing an insured to recover
defense costs where the insured does not have the financial resources to
pay those costs.266  An insurer that knows or should know that its insured
cannot reasonably reimburse the defense costs at issue, but that still 
pursues the matter to judgment, clearly harms the insured.267  Such  
conduct certainly bears the dress of bad faith, keeping in mind the 
varying bad faith standards between states.268  It  may be an act of bad  
263. See, e.g., Gibson v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 673 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Me.
1996).
264. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 781. 
265. See id.
266. The duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied in all contracts.  It is
undisputed that insurance policies, like all other contracts, are subject to this implied 
duty. See Vaughan v. McMinn, 945 P.2d 404, 406 (Colo. 1997); Best Place, Inc. v. Penn
Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334, 337-39 (Haw. 1996); Pavia v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 626 N.E.2d 24, 27 (N.Y. 1993); Swanson v. Sioux Valley Empire Elec. Ass’n, 535
N.W.2d 755, 758 (S.D. 1995); Austin Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 842 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1992); Levine v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 462 S.E.2d 81, 84 (Va. 1995). 
267. The judgment may impair the insured’s credit, or it may disrupt various 
business or financial relationships or opportunities. 
268. In order to breach its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, an insurer 
must do more than simply breach its contract with the insured.  As the Arkansas 
Supreme Court observed in First Marine Insurance Co. v. Booth, 876 S.W.2d 255 (Ark.
1994), “[t]o be liable for bad faith the insurer must engage in affirmative misconduct, 
without a good faith defense, in a malicious, dishonest, or oppressive attempt to avoid
liability.”  Id. at 257; accord Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 712 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Ky.
1986); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d 161, 164 
(Mich. 1986).  This high standard is not universal, however.  Several states allow bad 
faith recovery for an insurer’s simple negligence.  See, e.g., Indiana Ins. Co. v. Plummer
Power Mower & Tool Rental, Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1085, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992);
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 628 N.E.2d 14, 17 (Mass. 1994); 
Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex. 1994); Shamblin v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766, 776 (W. Va. 1990). 
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faith by the insurer merely to subject the insured to the expense of 
litigation where ultimate recovery is unlikely. 
Fourth, allowing insurers a right to reimbursement may chill insureds’ 
zealous defense.269  This chill may emanate from defense counsel’s fear 
that a zealous defense increases fees and expenses; hence, the less the
defense attorney does the better off the insured will be in the long run.
Alternatively, the insured may restrain defense counsel in order to hold
down legal fees and reduce its potential liability to the insurer in a 
subsequent action for reimbursement.  The insured’s defense suffers in
either instance. 
It seems unlikely that defense attorneys selected by insurers will allow 
the potential for reimbursement to impair their defense of insureds.  A 
defense attorney’s obligations to an insured exist independent of the 
insurance policy and of the relationship between the insurer and the
insured.270  The threat of reimbursement, no matter how certain, does not
alter the defense attorney’s ethical duties to the insured.  The defense 
attorney remains free to represent the insured as he sees fit.271 
If the insured chooses to restrain appointed defense counsel or its 
chosen counsel, thereby chilling its own defense, so be it.  Insureds are 
free to make such economic choices. The fact that a bare bones defense 
may increase the insured’s personal exposure on uncovered claims may
make the insured’s choice unwise, but it does not make it impermissible. 
The final argument to be made against insurers’ claimed right to 
reimbursement was advanced by Justice Kennard in his dissent in 
Buss.272  The basic thrust of Justice Kennard’s argument is that liability
insurance policies expressly obligate insurers to defend suits rather than
claims, such that the duty to defend entire actions necessarily
encompasses uncovered claims.273  This approach logically reflects 
insurers’ right to control the defense of litigation against their 
insureds.274  That is, by accepting the defense of claims that are not even
potentially covered, an “insurer acquires a freer hand and enhanced
control in the defense of those claims that are potentially covered.”275  In
this way the insurer gains control over its potential indemnity
269. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 781-82 (discussing this potential threat in connection
with insurers’ burden of proof in reimbursement actions). 
270. See Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 407 N.E.2d 47, 49 
(Ill. 1980); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 269 (Miss. 1988); 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mabry, 497 S.E.2d 844, 847 (Va. 1998). 
271. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 782. 
272. See id. at 784-87 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
273. See id. at 786-87. 
274. See id. at 785. 
275. Id.
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exposure.276 
This is a powerful argument insofar as it focuses on standard policy 
language obligating insurers to defend “suits.”  That portion of Justice 
Kennard’s thesis is difficult to refute.  The argument begins to unravel, 
however, when tied to insurers’ right to control the defense of mixed
actions. If, in a mixed action, counsel hired by the insurer to defend the 
insured can influence coverage through his conduct of the defense (as is 
often the case),277 the insured is entitled to independent counsel at the
insurer’s expense.278  The “logical quid pro quo”279 that Justice Kennard 
sees as requiring the insurer’s defense of some uncovered claims in an 
entire action in exchange for the right to global control of the defense no 
longer exists. The focus then returns to coverage, and the necessary link 
between coverage and the duty to defend upon which the Buss majority 
seized.
In summary, none of the arguments against recognizing insurers’ right
to reimbursement of defense costs attributable to clearly uncovered 
claims are compelling when closely scrutinized.  Even Justice Kennard’s
very fine argument in his dissent in Buss has its problems. Insurers’
right to reimbursement thus assumed, the focus shifts to the nature and 
extent of that right.  And, if an insurer does not have a right to 
reimbursement in a given case or in a particular set of circumstances,
how is it that the right did not attach? 
B. Insurers’ Perspective
Insurers quite naturally believe that they should be reimbursed for
their defense of uncovered claims. Buss lends insurers great support.
But how does an insurer’s right to reimbursement come about?  Once 
created, how might the right be limited? 
First, an insurer might grant itself a contractual right to reimbursement
in its policy.  Although standard liability policies do not include such 
provisions, nothing prevents an insurer from crafting a manuscript policy
276. See id.
277. See Douglas R. Richmond, Walking a Tightrope: The Tripartite Relationship 
Between Insurer, Insured, and Insurance Defense Counsel, 73 NEB. L. REV. 265, 273 
(1994) (“Defense counsel can often steer a case toward a coverage result favorable to the 
insurer. For example, a defense attorney may elicit deposition testimony supporting a
coverage defense.”). 
278. See generally Lost in the Eternal Triangle, supra note 70, at 485-92. 
279. Buss, 939 P.2d at 785 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
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that expressly confers a right to reimbursement.280 An insurer that
employs manuscript policies expressly conferring a right to 
reimbursement should prevail over an insured who argues that the 
attempted recovery of defense costs deprives him of the benefit of his 
bargain, or constitutes an effort by the insurer to renege on its 
contractual obligation.281  The insured agreed to the insurer’s right to 
reimbursement when he purchased the policy.  An insured that does not 
want to subject itself to potential reimbursement claims can purchase a
policy from another insurer that does not include such a provision.
Second, an insurer that wants a right to reimbursement might strike a 
separate agreement with its insured.  Such an agreement would have to 
be supported by adequate consideration.282  For example, an insurer and 
insured might agree that in exchange for the insured’s promise to
reimburse the insurer’s defense costs attributable to clearly uncovered 
claims, the insurer will waive the insured’s deductible or self-insured 
retention. 
Third, and most likely, insurers’ right to reimbursement may be
implied in law.283  The law implies this right to prevent insureds’ unjust
enrichment.  An insurer’s action to recoup defense costs clearly
attributed to uncovered claims is therefore one for restitution, as the Buss
court recognized.284 
1. The Law of Restitution 
“Restitution,” which means restoration, is a difficult subject.285  The  
term is broadly used to refer to “the law of nonbargained benefits.”286 
Restitution is not a cause of action, but a general description of the relief 
afforded a successful plaintiff.287  It may be sought in tort actions and
contract actions, and it may be sought either in law or in equity.288 
Because it is a remedy, restitution can be employed in any case in which
it is appropriate.289  Restitution is intended to remedy unjust enrichment. 
The general principle of restitution may be stated as follows: “A 
person who receives a benefit by reason of an infringement of another 
280. A manuscript policy is written to include coverages, conditions or exclusions 
not found in a standard policy. See  GLOSSARY OF INSURANCE TERMS 157 (Thomas A.
Green, et. al., eds., 5th ed. 1994). 
281. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 782. 
282. See id. at 776. 
283. See id.
284. See id. at 776-77. 
285. See DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1, at 222 (1973)
286. Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 65 (1985). 
287. See DOBBS, supra note 285, § 4.1, at 222. 
288. See id. § 4.1, at 223. 
289. See id.
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person’s interest, or of loss suffered by the other, owes restitution to him 
in the manner and amount necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.”290 
This definition makes clear that a defendant’s duty to make restitution 
has a basis independent of strict rules of contract and tort.  Indeed, a 
right to restitution may arise in cases in which no contractual obligation 
exists and no tort occurs.291  Applying the elements of restitution to the
defense of a mixed action, the benefit is the defense provided to the 
insured, the infringement or loss is the insurer’s payment of the insured’s 
defense in connection with uncovered claims, and the unjust enrichment
to be avoided through restitution is the insured’s receipt of a free defense
against claims that are not covered under its policy.
Establishing the recipient’s entitlement or right to the benefit 
conferred is a logical first step in restitution analysis.  If the recipient is 
entitled or has a right to the benefit, he cannot be unjustly enriched by its 
receipt. Conversely, absent a right or entitlement, any enrichment may 
be unjust. It does not matter that the recipient gained the benefit 
honestly, for restitution is aimed not at compensating the plaintiff, but at 
compelling the defendant to disgorge benefits that in equity and good 
conscience he ought not keep.292 
The recipient’s lack of entitlement or right to the subject benefit,
however, will not alone start courts or litigants down the path to 
restitution. If the benefits conferred do not unjustly enrich the recipient, 
the lack of entitlement or a right is inconsequential.293  As a general rule,
a recipient is not unjustly enriched, and thus does not owe restitution,
when the benefit was conferred by a “volunteer or intermeddler.”294 
This general rule disfavoring volunteers involves two distinct 
principles. First, one who confers a benefit upon another with the 
intention of making a gift has no claim for restitution against the 
recipient in the absence of duress, fraud, mistake or undue influence.295 
The recipient of the benefit is enriched, but not unjustly so, for there is
no injustice in retaining a gift freely given.296  This principle holds
without regard for the form of the gift.  For example, gratuitously
 290. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
291. See id. § 1 cmt. a.
292. See DOBBS, supra note 285, § 4.1, at 224. 
293. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 290, at § 1 cmt. h.
294. DOBBS, supra note 285, § 4.9, at 298; see also Levmore, supra note 286, at 65. 
295. See DOBBS, supra note 285, § 4.9, at 299. 
296. See id.
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rendered services are encompassed by this principle.297 
Second, one who confers a benefit upon another without affording the
recipient an opportunity to decline the benefit has no claim for 
restitution absent some special policy outweighing the recipient’s right 
to free choice.298  Intermeddlers should not be encouraged to invade the
affairs of others by rewarding them for their conduct.299 
This second principle is closely linked to the hostility to 
“officiousness” found in the law of restitution.  “A person who receives 
a benefit through conduct officious as to him does not owe restitution to
the person so acting.”300 A person may be said to act officiously “when
he intervenes in the affairs of another without adequate justification,
such as that which may be afforded by a request or a mistake.”301  A
person cannot thrust a benefit on another and thereby become the 
recipient’s creditor.302 
Officiousness should not be a concern in at least two instances 
relevant to liability insurance and the reimbursement of defense costs.
First, action that is requested and that benefits the person making the 
request is usually not officious insofar as the requesting party is
concerned.303  This principle may apply where an insured asks an insurer 
to defend a mixed action.  Assuming that the insured requests or
demands a defense of the action in its entirety, can the insurer’s defense
of uncovered claims be deemed to be officious?  Logically, no. The 
insured requested the defense and it benefitted from the defense.
Second, action taken under duress is deemed not to be officious.304  If an
insurer defends under a reservation of rights and the insured threatens to 
settle or confess judgment, or to make a bad faith claim, the insurer may
change its position and defend unconditionally.  Is the insurer’s defense 
of an uncovered claim in those circumstances officious?  Does the
insured’s threat of voluntary liability or bad faith constitute “duress” 
under the law of restitution?  The answers to these questions probably 
depend on the facts of the particular case. 
Finally, an expenditure resulting in a mutual advantage will seldom 
support restitution.305  If the person conferring the benefit or making the




 300. RESTATEMENT, supra note 290, at § 2. 
301. Id. 
302. See id. § 2 cmt. a.
303. See id. § 2 cmt. b. 
 304. See id. 
305. See, e.g., Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 886 P.2d 772, 776 (Idaho 1994). 
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did so voluntarily or officiously.  If he acted as a volunteer or as an
officious intermeddler, the recipient was not unjustly enriched by the
benefit conferred.306  If he did not act voluntarily or officiously, there 
still is no right to restitution because he has suffered no loss.307  After all, 
he too derived a benefit from his action. 
2. Restitution and Reimbursing Defense Costs 
The court in Buss v. Superior Court308 premised Transamerica’s 
recovery of its defense costs attributable to clearly uncovered claims on
the law of restitution.309  The Buss court reasoned that the insured was 
enriched by the insurer’s “bearing of unbargained-for defense costs” 
and, because the insurer’s financial burden was inconsistent with its 
freedom under the policy, the insured’s enrichment was unjust.310  The 
court did not consider Transamerica’s motive in defending the claims
that its policy did not cover, observing that an insurer’s motive is hard to 
discern, if not impossible.311  Accordingly, the court looked only at the
results of Transamerica’s action.312  This is an objective analysis, not a
subjective one.313 
The insurance industry has warmly embraced Buss, hailing the 
decision as a “major victory.”314  That it may be, and probably is.  The
larger issue, however, is whether Buss was rightly decided, such that it 
should become the law nationally.  More specifically, when are liability
insurers entitled to restitution for defense costs attributable to clearly
uncovered claims? 
It must first be noted that an insurer seeking the recovery of defense 
costs can assert a right to restitution only in connection with the defense 
of a mixed action.  This basic principle flows primarily from insurance 
law, not from the law of restitution.  An insurer cannot recover its 
defense costs in a case in which all of the plaintiff’s claims are
ultimately determined to be outside coverage, for the duty to defend can
499
 306. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 290, at § 2 cmt. d. 
 307. See id.
 308. 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997). 
 309. See id. at 768-69. 
310. Id. at 777. 
 311. See id. at 777 n.14. 
312. See id. 
313. See id. 
314. Brady, supra note 6, at 30. 

























   
 
only be extinguished prospectively.315  Once it is established that there is
no potential coverage under any theory, the insurer’s duty to defend 
ends. The insurer cannot recover its defense costs incurred prior to the 
determination of no coverage, for until that determination was made the 
claims were potentially covered and the insurer was obligated to defend 
them at its expense.316 Once it is determined that it has no further duty 
to defend, the insurer may withdraw its defense, thus eliminating the 
possibility that it might incur costs defending clearly uncovered claims.
Insurers’ right to reimbursement is further limited to the defense of
mixed actions by the law of restitution and common sense.  An insurer 
that defends an action in which all of the plaintiff’s claims clearly are
uncovered surely does so as a volunteer, such that no right to restitution 
will lie.317  As a practical matter, insurers do not defend cases where
there clearly is no potential coverage. 
An insured undoubtedly benefits by an insurer’s defense of an action.
This benefit exists even if the defense is provided under reservation. 
Should an insurer defending under reservation later seek to recoup its 
defense costs attributable to clearly uncovered claims, the insured still
has benefitted from the qualified defense because it did not have to pay
for the defense up front.  The insurer has essentially made an interest
free loan to the insured. The insured had a defense by competent
counsel while retaining the use of its money.  If the insured is required to
make restitution to the insurer, i.e., to repay the insurer for its defense of 
clearly uncovered claims, the insured is no worse off than if the insurer 
had never provided a defense. 
The benefit to the insured exists without regard for whether the insurer 
is controlling the defense (as is usually the case) or whether the insured 
is controlling the defense (as is the case where the insurer pays the 
insured’s independent counsel because of a conflict of interest).  In the
latter instance the insured cannot possibly claim that it is prejudiced by
having to reimburse the insurer because the insured  selected its own 
counsel, just as it would have in any case where it is uninsured, and by 
directing the defense it was able to control its ultimate liability to the 
insurer. Again, the insured has received the equivalent of an interest-
free loan. If the insurer controls the defense, the most the insured 
reasonably can argue is that the insurer overspent.  Though such a 
contention seems unlikely,318 the insured is free to challenge the defense
315. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 773. 
316. See id. at 775. 
317. See supra notes 294-97 and accompanying text. 
318. There are at least two reasons for thinking it unlikely that an insured might
claim that an insurer overspent on a defense.  First, this is the exact opposite of what 
insureds usually purport to fear. Insureds typically contend that insurers do not spend
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costs for which reimbursement is sought. 
The next question to be asked in analyzing insurers’ right to restitution 
is whether an insurer’s defense of claims that are not even potentially 
covered under its policy constitute an “infringement” of its interests or a 
“loss?”319  These are alternative elements.  Clearly, an insurer’s payment 
of defense costs attributable to uncovered claims is a loss to the insurer
because it represents a diversion of income.320  The insurer suffers a loss
even if it defends the insured with “staff counsel,”  i.e., salaried
insurance company employees,321 for such a defense represents a 
wasteful application of the insurer’s services.322  Whether a defense of
uncovered claims infringes an insurer’s interests is far less clear.  An 
infringement typically is seen as an offense,323 and an insured who 
merely tenders his defense to an insurer or who accepts a defense under
reservation has not acted offensively. Of course, there being a loss to
the insurer, a determination of infringement is unnecessary.
Finally, an insured who receives a defense for clearly uncovered 
claims appears to be unjustly enriched.  Neither the insured nor the
insurer bargained for the insurer to bear the cost of defending uncovered
claims.324  An insurer’s defense of clearly uncovered claims is
inconsistent with its freedom under the policy and the insured cannot 
reasonably expect the insurer to defend uncovered claims; as a result, the 
insured’s enrichment by such a defense must be unjust.325 
Looking no further, an insurer that defends clearly uncovered claims 
would appear to be entitled to restitution from the insured.  But the 
analysis cannot stop there.  Generally, for an insurer to have a right to
restitution, it cannot have acted as a volunteer, provided the defense 
officiously, or defended in order to achieve a mutual advantage.  If an
insurer defends voluntarily or officiously, or if it defends in the pursuit 
of mutual advantage, the insured’s enrichment is not unjust.
enough on the defense of claims for which coverage is questionable.  Second, insurers 
are very sophisticated consumers of legal services.  They typically strive to limit defense 
expenditures to those tasks, items or services that are reasonable and necessary.
319. RESTATEMENT, supra note 290, at § 1.
320. See id. § 1 cmt. g. 
321. For a general discussion of insurers’ staff counsel operations, see Lost in the
Eternal Triangle, supra note 70, at 512-14. 
322. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 290, at § 1 cmt. g.
323. See id.
324. See Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766, 776 (Cal. 1997); A Further 
Explanation, supra note 247, at 320; but see Quinn, supra note 75, at 33. 
325. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 777. 
 501


































   
 
An insurer that defends a mixed action does not do so voluntarily.
The insurer must defend a mixed action “as an obligation imposed by
law in support of the policy.”326  Moreover, an insurer that defends a
mixed action presumably does so at the insured’s demand or request. 
The insurer is contractually obligated to defend those claims that are
actually or potentially covered, and it cannot reasonably cull out the
uncovered claims and defend only the remaining covered claims.327  The
insured’s demand or request for a defense thus requires the insurer’s 
action; the insurer does not defend voluntarily.
Closely linked to the notion of a defending insurer as a volunteer is the 
concept of an insurer as an officious intermeddler.  An insurer should 
not be able to thrust a benefit upon an insured and later seek payment for
it.328 
Any concern that an insurer is acting officiously by defending a mixed
action should be eliminated by the insured’s demand or request for a 
defense.329  The insured’s demand or request avoids any infringement on
his autonomy.  An insured’s demand or request for a defense may in fact 
be an essential element of an insurer’s right to restitution.330 
Additionally, officiousness is not a basis to deny restitution if the
party conferring the benefit does so as a result of coercion or duress.
The claimed coercion or duress must, of course, result in unjust
enrichment to the party acting coercively or causing the duress.331 
Unjust enrichment in this situation usually takes one of two forms: either 
the party acting coercively obtains money or property for which he gives 
nothing in exchange, or he forces the other party to enter into or perform
a contract.332  This is exactly the situation where an insurer defends an
insured as a response to coercion or out of duress: the insured receives a
defense for which he paid no premiums, or the insurer performs a 
contract although it has no obligation to do so.
What, then, is the coercion or duress that might render an insurer’s 
defense of its insured involuntary?  What risks does an insurer face if it 
wrongfully or erroneously declines to defend its insured?  There are 
minor risks: for example, an insurer that declines to defend may see the
insured hire defense counsel who are not as skilled as the attorneys the 
326. Id. at 775; see also Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Co., 948 P.2d 
909, 921 (Cal. 1997) (stating that an insurer “has a duty to defend [an] entire ‘mixed’ 
action imposed by law in support of the policy”) (emphasis in original). 
327. See Buss, 939 P.2d at 775. 
328. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 290, at § 2 cmt. a. 
329. See id. § 2 cmt. b (“Action that is requested and that produces a benefit for the 
person making the request is usually not officious as to him.”). 
330. See id.
331. See GEORGE E. PALMER, 2 THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 9.4, at 257 (1978). 
332. See id. § 9.4, at 257-58. 
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insurer would employ, thereby inflating defense costs and indirectly
increasing the insurer’s indemnity obligation.  There are also very
significant risks. An insurer that breaches its duty to defend loses the
right to contest the insured’s liability, it may lose otherwise valid
coverage defenses, it loses the right to control the insured’s defense, and 
it may be bound by the insured’s decision to settle or to confess 
judgment even if the insurer would not have settled on the terms 
offered.333  It therefore seems reasonable to assume that an insurer that
defends uncovered claims does so as a result of coercion or duress.334 
That coercion or duress might be assumed does not mean that they
cannot be disproved. An insurer that is presented with a case of
questionable coverage is not powerless to protect itself.  For example,
the insurer might defend under a reservation of rights and file a 
declaratory judgment action.335  The insurer might intervene in the third-
party action, request a bifurcated trial on the issue of coverage, and 
move to stay litigation of the liability issues until coverage is decided.336 
Alternatively, an insurer might file a declaratory judgment action and
ask that the underlying tort action be stayed until the declaratory
judgment action is decided.337  So long as an insurer has a means by
which it might reasonably protect its interests, it arguably cannot be 
coerced into a defense.
An insurer that defends in pursuit of a mutual advantage is not entitled 
to restitution; the benefit that the insurer receives from the defense 
means that there can be no loss in need of a remedy.  It is here that
insurers’ right to reimbursement of defense costs is weakest.  An insurer
that defends under reservation instead of declining to defend may do so 
to protect itself against a subsequent claim that it breached its duty.338  If
333. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text. 
334. There may be particular cases in which this assumption is wrong.  For
example, a case may be so simple or the damages at issue so minor that any settlement of 
size by the insured can be successfully challenged as being unreasonable.  An insurer 
that defends such an action likely does so for reasons other than coercion or duress. 
335. See Morgan v. Guaranty Nat’l Cos., 489 S.E.2d 803, 805 (Ga. 1997)
(suggesting this course of action by quoting earlier case); see, e.g., Guaranty Nat’l Ins.
Co. v. George, 953 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Ky. 1997) (holding that insurer which defended
under a reservation of rights and filed declaratory judgment action to determine coverage 
did not act in bad faith). 
336. See Bradley Corp. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 1193, 1198 (E.D. Wis. 
1997) (discussing Wisconsin law). 
337. See Ballmer v. Ballmer, 923 S.W.2d 365, 369-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
338. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lesher, 231 Cal. Rptr. 791, 809-10 (Ct. App. 1986), 
disapproved by Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997). 
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so, the insurer defends for its own advantage or benefit; any benefit to 
the insured is merely incidental.339 
The Buss court avoided this obvious impediment to restitution in a 
footnote.340  The court concluded that “[s]uch reasoning fails” because
“[i]t turns on motive.”341 Motive lies in the heart and mind, and is
therefore difficult to discern.342  This difficulty is magnified in the case
of any corporation—the heart or mind of which is purely fictitious.  The 
court thus declined such subjective analysis. The court instead focused 
on the benefit to the insured that results from the insurers’ defense,
which is an objective analysis.343 
If the Buss court erred, it did so on this point. Insurers, like all 
corporations, act through their employees.  An insurer’s heart or mind
beats or functions in its management personnel.  An insurer’s motive can 
therefore be discerned by way of depositions and company documents.
An insurer may defend solely to benefit itself, although the insured also 
derives a benefit. An insurer might also defend particular claims 
primarily to benefit the insured.  Either way, the insurer’s motive should 
be discoverable. 
The objective analysis employed by the Buss court may be the easiest
approach, but it is not necessarily the correct one.  Policyholders might 
reasonably argue that basic principles of restitution demand that other 
courts take the subjective approach that the California Supreme Court 
rejected.  An insurer’s right to restitution will thus turn on the facts of
the particular case. This is an unremarkable proposition.  Case-specific 
determinations are common to all areas of the law and insurers’ right to 
reimbursement should be no different.
Even if an insurer defends to protect itself against the insured’s
unilateral action or later claims of bad faith or breach of contract, thus 
creating a mutual advantage, such self-protection may not bar restitution. 
The mutual advantage defense to restitution assumes that the party
conferring the benefit has time to reflect on the decision.344  That is be to
contrasted with the situation in which a person provides assistance in an 
emergency to a person threatened with a loss.  In an emergency, the 
person conferring the benefit does not gain a material advantage by
doing so.345  Restitution in cases of private exigency is granted because
of the exigency and without regard for the motive of the party conferring
504
 339. See id. 
 340. See Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766, 777-78 n.14 (Cal. 1997). 
341. Id. at 777. 
 342. See id. 
 343. See id. at 777-78. 
 344. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 290, at § 2 cmt. d. 
 345. See id.
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the benefit.346  The emergency or exigency need not be life-threatening, 
related to personal safety, or linked to some sort of natural disaster; a
purely commercial crisis or business threat suffices.347 
An insurer faced with an insured’s demand for a defense does not 
necessarily have time to make a considered decision to defend.  The
insured is faced with potentially ruinous defense costs and, in many 
cases, the insured lacks the ability, knowledge or resources necessary to 
mount an effective defense.  Because the discovery of facts necessary to 
determine the existence or scope of coverage may take months,348 the 
insured cannot wait for the insurer to study all relevant factors and issues
before providing a defense.349  The focus is not the advantage gained by 
the insurer through its defense, but the potential loss to the insured if a 
defense is not timely provided.  The insurer’s advantage should be 
immaterial. 
Absent a private exigency, an insurer might still defeat an insured’s
claim of mutual advantage.  That is because an insurer gains no 
advantage by defending uncovered claims.  An insurer benefits only 
from defending potentially covered claims, for only its failure to defend 
those claims (or obviously covered claims) will breach its duty to the 
insured. There are no negative consequences for an insurer that declines
to defend uncovered claims. 
If an insurer derives no advantage from defending uncovered claims, 
there obviously can be no mutual advantage; the only advantage belongs 
to the insured.350  And, whether described as an advantage or benefit, it 
is something for which the insured did not pay.351  The insured therefore
is unjustly enriched and the insurer is entitled to restitution. 
3. Perfecting the Insurer’s Right 
An insurer that hopes to recoup its costs incurred defending uncovered 
346. See id. § 3 cmt. a.
347. See id. (extending this principle to the payment of a secured debt). 
348. It is also possible that an insured may conceal facts or information from its 
insurer in an attempt to cloud coverage issues and obtain a defense to which the insured 
is not rightfully entitled. See A Further Explanation, supra note 247, at 320. 
349. See Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766, 775 (Cal. 1997) (observing that 
“[t]o defend meaningfully, [an] insurer must defend immediately”).
350. As noted previously, an insurer defends uncovered claims in a mixed action
not because it has a contractual duty to do so, but because of an obligation imposed by
law in support of the policy. See id. at 775. 
351. See id. at 776. 
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claims must clearly reserve its right to do so.  Alternatively, the insured 
must to agree to reimbursement.  As a fundamental matter of insurance 
law, an insurer must reserve its right to reimbursement, or preserve its 
right to reimbursement by way of non-waiver agreement or separate
contract, in order to avoid a later claim by the insured that it waived its 
right.352  Under the law of restitution, an insurer must reserve its right in 
order to establish that it is not a volunteer and that the benefit of a 
defense was not gratuitously conferred.  An insurer’s reservation of
rights also eliminates any reasonable claim by the insured that he
detrimentally relied on the insurer’s defense, such that making restitution 
would leave him worse off than if the insurer had never acted to protect 
him.353 
In most states, the insured need not consent to the insurer’s reservation 
of rights in order for it to be effective.354 But what if the insured objects
to the insurer’s reservation?  Will the insured’s objection defeat the 
insurer’s right to reimbursement? 
Applying Texas law, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that an
insurer’s tender of a defense under reservation, even though rejected by
the insured, prevents any breach by the insurer.355  Other jurisdictions
have reached the same conclusion.356  This would seem to be the correct 
position: an insurer should not have to elect between its right to deny
coverage for claims outside its policy and its right to protection against 
the many negative consequences flowing from a breach of the duty to 
defend. Similarly, an insured should not be allowed to force an insurer 
to elect between the exercise of its policy right to defend and its right to
decline a defense not owed. In short, an insured should not be allowed
to extort a benefit to which it is not entitled. 
Insurers should carefully select those cases in which they pursue the 
reimbursement of defense costs.  For example, an insurer should not 
seek reimbursement in a case in which it will appear to be an economic 
352. See id. at 784 n.27. 
353. See Haz-Mat Response, Inc. v. Certified Waste Servs. Ltd., 910 P.2d 839, 847
(Kan. 1996) (suggesting that beneficiary’s detrimental reliance might preclude 
restitution).
354. See Walbrook Ins. Co. v. Goshgarian & Goshgarian, 726 F. Supp. 777, 783
(C.D. Cal. 1989) (“[A] survey of the limited number of cases on refusals to consent to 
reservations of rights . . . shows that the modern trend is to find a unilateral reservation to 
be effective without the insured’s consent.”).
355. See, e.g., United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Olympia Wings, Inc., 
896 F.2d 949, 953-55 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 903 F.2d 826 (1990) (No. 88-2699); Ideal 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Myers, 789 F.2d 1196, 1200-1201 (5th Cir. 1986); Rhodes v. Chicago
Ins. Co., 719 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1983). 
356. See, e.g., American Home Assurance Co. v. Glenn Estess & Assocs., Inc., 763
F.2d 1237, 1238-40 (11th Cir. 1985) (interpreting Alabama law; insurer also pursued
declaratory judgment action). 
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bully.  An insurer that appears to cross the line from prosecutor of its
legal and equitable rights to persecutor of its insured is unlikely to 
impress a court or jury, and it may well invite a bad faith claim by the
insured. Insurers obviously should not pursue insureds who are 
insolvent or who do not have the means to reimburse the defense costs at
issue. There are other good business reasons for insurers to exercise 
restraint when considering the possibility of restitution.  For example, an 
insurer may have a continuing relationship with an important 
commercial insured.  Commercial insureds often pay six figure annual
premiums, and an insurer that sues such a plum insured may lose that
business to a competing carrier. 
Sophisticated insureds and reasonable insurers who recognize the 
implications of Buss may negotiate their differences at the outset of the 
underlying tort action, rather than becoming embroiled in expensive 
coverage litigation to allocate costs later.  “Deals [can] be struck for an 
up-front allocation of all defense costs, with a certain percentage 
assigned to the insured for payment and a certain percentage assigned to 
the insurer.”357 Courts seem likely to favor this approach in most cases, 
for it should reduce litigation.358 
V. CONCLUSION
Liability insurers are rightly concerned about defense costs and they 
have taken a number of steps to reduce them.  As a logical extension of
their efforts to control defense costs, insurers have long sought to recoup 
their costs incurred defending uncovered claims from their insureds.
Insurers’ right to be reimbursed their defense costs by their insureds has 
been greatly enhanced by the Supreme Court of California’s recent
decision in Buss v. Superior Court.359  Whether hailed360 or condemned,
Buss is a significant decision that reaches well beyond California. 
Insurers that have overlooked their potential right to reimbursement 
before are more likely to assert it now, and insureds who have typically 
taken defenses under reservation for granted must now study the 
357. Brady, supra note 6, at 31. 
358. See id.
359. 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997). 
360. See Brady, supra note 6, at 32 (asserting that Buss “must be classified as one 
of the best decision for the insurance industry in California in many years,” and further
stating that the decisions restored “equity and balance in the relationship between insurer
and insured”). 
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financial consequences of the bargains they strike with their insurers. 
Insurers’ right to the reimbursement of their costs incurred defending
clearly uncovered claims is well grounded in the law of restitution.
Though recognizing insurers’ right to reimbursement may strike insureds
as unfair, it is no more unfair than requiring an insurer to fund a defense 
for which it did not bargain.  To the contrary, the equities weigh in favor 
of insurers. An insured who is defended against uncovered claims is 
unjustly enriched by that defense.  The defending insurer is compelled to
provide a defense for which it collected no premiums, and should it not 
defend, the insurer potentially faces significant liability. 
That is not to say that an insurer will automatically be entitled to 
restitution from its insured.  Insurers’ right to restitution should be
determined on a case-by-case basis.  Insurers must timely and properly 
reserve their rights to seek the reimbursement of their defense costs
attributable to clearly uncovered claims, and thereafter prove their
entitlement to restitution by a preponderance of the evidence.  There are 
sure to be cases in which insurers will not be allowed to recover their
defense costs.
Fortunately for insureds, insurers’ right to restitution is limited to the 
defense of clearly uncovered claims in mixed actions.  Furthermore, 
insurers are likely to seek reimbursement only in special cases,
characterized by significant defense costs, claims that can be neatly
segregated into covered and uncovered categories for allocation 
purposes, and insureds with the financial resources to bear appropriate 
defense costs.  These factors do not often converge.  In the cases where 
they do, recognizing insurers’ right to reimbursement may force insurers 
and insureds to compromise on the allocation of defense costs, rather
than litigating allocation issues in expensive and time consuming
coverage actions. 
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